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DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVES
Vada Berger*
Each kind of passion-man-and-woman passion, man-and-man -pas-
sion-has all degrees of love .... The only difference is-the only damned
difference is that for us there's no way of getting social sanction-so we go
around the world like a lot of sorry ghosts, being forever ashamed of a thing
we've no reason to be ashamed of.
Richard Meeker'
INTRODUCTION
Richard Meeker expressed his frustration concerning the treatment of ho-
mosexual couples in his 1933 novel Better Angel.' Unfortunately, the lack of
social sanction Meeker lamented has not changed much in the almost sixty
years since the publication of his novel. In general, society still does not recog-
nize the existence of homosexual couples, and fails to provide them with the
benefits of social, and legal sanction.
The legal, and social invisibility of homosexual couples is stark in contrast
to the benefits provided to married heterosexual couples.3 Indeed, "[miarriage
triggers a universe of rights, privileges, and presumptions."4 Some of the privi-
leges available to married couples include favored immigration status,5 the
J.D., 1990, Harvard Law School; Law Clerk, The Honorable Richard S. Arnold, U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The author would like to thank Professor Martha Minow of the Harvard Law School for her
encouragement and advice in the writing of this Article. She would also like to thank Mary Bilder
for commenting on previous drafts of this Article.
1. R. MEEKER, BETTER ANGEL 206-07 (paperback ed. 1987, original publication 1933).
2. Id.
3. This contrast is particularly ironic given the number of unmarried couples in this country.
Census estimates as of 1988 indicated that out of 91 million households in the United States,
unmarried heterosexual couples account for 2.6 million households and homosexual couples ac-
count for 1.6 million households. Zonana, Census Will Count "Unmarried Partners" for First
Time, L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1990, at A38, col. 1, A39, col. 3. In fact, the Census Bureau is
including the category of "unmarried partner" in its 1990 Census. Id. at A38, col. 3. Only 27 % of
households are composed of traditional families of two parents living with children. Gutis, What is
a Family? Traditional Limits Are Being Redrawn, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1989, at Cl, col. 6, C6,
col. 1.
4. Stoddard, Yes: Marriage Is A Fundamental Right, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 42.
5. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1988) (granting the immigrant spouse of a U.S. citizen non-
quota immigration status).
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right of hospital, and jail visitation,' reduced cost club memberships,7 the abil-
ity to file joint tax returns,8 exemption from gift taxes, 9 estate tax deduc-
tions, 10 extension of health and dental benefits," the right to sue for loss of
consortium, and wrongful death, 2 the privilege not to testify against one an-
other,' 3 the ability to own property as tenants in the entirety,, intestate suc-
cession, 5 and entitlement to Social Security benefits. 6
None of these privileges is available to homosexual couples or any unmar-
ried couples, even though such couples may be deeply committed, and may be
each other's only family as a practical matter.17 Marriage is not an option for
homosexual couples. No state currently permits same-sex marriage.' 8 Simi-
larly, no state recognizing common-law marriages allows homosexual relation-
ships to qualify for that status.' 9
In response to the failure of states to provide protection for homosexual
6. See, e.g., Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits Through Liti-
gation, Legislation, and Collective Bargaining, 2 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 46-50 (1986) (indicating
that visitation rights are typically available only to traditional family members).
7. See. e.g., Olson & Popp v. Y.M.C.A. of Metropolitan Madison, Inc., No. 3110 (Madison,
Wisc., Equal Opportunities Comm'n, Oct. 10, 1985) (affirming that the denial of a Y.M.C.A.
family membership to a lesbian couple did not violate the local Equal Opportunity Ordinance).
8. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (1988) (providing for the filing of joint tax returns by "husband
and wife").
9. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 2001(d) (1988) (providing for a tax adjustment for gift taxes paid by
decedent spouse).
10. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 2056 (1988) (providing a surviving spouse with marital tax
deductions).
11. See, e.g., Hinman v. Department of Personnel, 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410
(1985) (upholding a policy providing dental benefits only to married partners of state employees
despite equal protection and due process challenges).
12. See, e.g., Comment, Consortium Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
147, 149-50 (1985) (indicating that loss of consortium is a remedy generally available only to
married persons).
13. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 970 (Deering 1990) (a spouse has the privilege not to be
called as a witness to testify against a spouse).
14. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.1 (Deering 1986) (stating the presumption that property
acquired during marriage is tenancy in the entirety property).
15. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1990) (providing that at
least a portion of decedent's estate goes to the surviving spouse in the event that decedent died
intestate).
16. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 426 (1990) (providing medicare benefits to spouses of those insured);
see also L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 217-18 (1981) (summarizing some of the
economic benefits of marriage not available to those denied a marriage contract); Folberg &
Buren, Domestic Partnership: A Proposal for Dividing the Property of Unmarried Families, 12
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 453, 459 n.51 (1976).
17. See generally T. STODDARD, E. BOGGAN, M. HAFT, C. LISTER & J. Rupp, AN ACLU
HANDBOOK: THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE 80-94 (rev. ed. 1983) (acknowledging the existence of
committed gay couples and providing guidance to problems such couples might face).
18. See Note, Marital Status Classifications: Protecting Homosexual and Heterosexual
Cohabitators, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 111 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Marital Status Classifica-
tions] (discussing rights that are available to couples absent the right to marry); see also UNIF.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 201, 9A U.L.A. 160 (1987) (defining marriage as "a personal
relationship between a man and a woman").
19. See NATIONAL LAWYER'S GUILD, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 3.04[l] (R.
Achtenberg ed. 1985).
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couples, several cities have adopted "domestic partnership initiatives. '20 A
typical domestic partnership initiative allows homosexual couples to register
with the city in order to obtain marital-type benefits that are within the city's
ability to provide.2'
This Article analyzes domestic partnership initiatives, their protections,
their effectiveness, and their vulnerabilities. In Part I of this Article, I explain
the need for domestic partnership initiatives. In Part II, I describe domestic
partnership initiatives and the manner in which couples qualify for domestic
partnership benefits. In Part III, I analyze the initiatives. I discuss practical
problems involved with implementing domestic partnership initiatives, such as
procuring willing insurers. I also discuss the limitations of city-based solutions,
due to the supremacy of state and federal law over municipal law. Finally, in
Part III, I discuss the extent to which domestic partnership initiatives reflect
an alternative vision of the kind of relationships which our society should pro-
tect and promote.
This Article addresses the ability of homosexual couples to receive the pro-
tections and privileges provided by municipal law through domestic partner-
ship initiatives.2 The Article focuses on homosexual cohabitators, even though
heterosexual cohabitators encounter many of the same problems since neither
group's relationships are protected by marital status."s
The failure of the law to protect heterosexual and homosexual cohabiting
couples can have tragic consequences for both groups. The issue of protecting
20. Berkeley, California, for example, has adopted a domestic partnership initiative embodied
by a Domestic Partnership Information Sheet and Affidavit. See Berkeley, Cal., Domestic Part-
nership Information Sheet (1987); Berkeley, Cal., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership (1986). For
an example of a Domestic Partnership Ordinance, see infra Appendix A. For an example of an
Affidavit of Domestic Partnership, see infra Appendix B.
21. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1987) (granting health-
care benefits to the domestic partners of city employees).
22. As with any article of limited scope, the issues not discussed are as disturbing as the issues
that are discussed. I do not, for example, discuss the discrimination faced by individual homosexu-
als due to their sexual orientation. I also do not analyze the obligation of governmental entities to
extend unmarried partners status-related benefits or other entitlements.
23. The refrain that heterosexual cohabitators may simply "choose to marry" to solve their
problems ignores the complexity of what marriage represents as an institution. See Blumberg,
Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1136 (1981).
Many heterosexual couples, for example, may choose not to marry due to the subjugation and
hierarchy they associate with marriage. To state that their failure to marry is merely a matter of
choice undervalues the role definition supplied by marital bonds. Indeed, Ambrose Bierce defined
marriage as "the state or condition of a community consisting of a master, a mistress and two
slaves, making in all, two." H. CURRY & D. CLIFFORD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY
COUPLES 3:4 n.2 (5th ed. 1989) (quoted without citation); see also Cronan, Marriage, in FEMI-
NIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN WOMEN
AND MEN 240 (A. Jaggar & P. Struhl eds., paperback ed. 1978) (comparing marriage to slavery).
Moreover, many couples, married or cohabiting, simply do not realize the legal, as opposed to
social, ramifications of marriage. See supra Blumberg, at 1169-1170; see also Glendon, Marriage
And The State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663, 687 (1976) (indicating
that lack of concern for marriage is growing due, in part, to the perception that the law does not
provide advantages to married couples).
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homosexual couples, however, generates more fear and criticism from the op-
ponents of domestic partnership initiatives in view of the AIDS crisis and
heterosexism. 4 Protecting homosexual couples also creates complicated legal
problems in view of state obstacles such as antisodomy laws.", Thus, while
domestic partnership initiatives extend benefits to both heterosexual and ho-
mosexual couples, my emphasis will be on homosexual couples.
I. DEVELOPING THE NEED FOR DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVES
Since marriage is not an option, homosexual couples have been compelled to
draft legal documents and rely on litigation to protect their rights. The results
of these efforts, however, have largely been unsatisfactory.
For the most part, litigation efforts attempting to procure the benefits asso-
ciated with marital or familial status for homosexual couples have failed. In In
re Guardianship of Kowalski,2" a Minnesota appeals court affirmed a lower
court ruling granting sole custody of an incapacitated woman to her father,
over the objections of the woman's female partner of more than four years."
The appeals court affirmed the grant of sole guardianship even though the
father terminated the visiting rights of the partner following the lower court's
decision.28
In Hinman v. Department of Personnel,29 a California appeals court upheld
the denial of state dental benefits to a state employee's homosexual partner."
The court ruled that the denial of benefits did not violate either the equal
protection clause of the California Constitution or a state employment policy
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 1 Despite recog-
nizing that eligibility for the dental plan was determined by marital status, the
court concluded that the discrimination served the legitimate state interest of
promoting marriage.3 2 Although California law prohibits employment discrim-
ination on the basis of marital status, the court ruled that the bona fide fringe
24. See, e.g., Bodovitz, Domestic Partner Debate May Key on Economics, San Francisco
Chron., Oct. 16, 1989, at A4, col I (reporting that opponents fear the domestic partnership ordi-
nance will compromise the city's ability to provide health care benefits because the pool of eligible
domestic partners will include people with a high risk of contracting AIDS).
25. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the fourteenth amendment
does not encompass the right of a male homosexual to engage in consensual sodomy); see infra
notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing Bowers).
26. 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986).
27. Id. at 863. The court found the relationship of the partners "uncertain." The two women
had been roommates for four years, had exchanged rings, and had named each- other as benefi-
ciary in their respective life insurance policies. Prior to her accident, however, Sharon Kowalski
closed the partners' joint bank account and told her sister that she was considering moving to
Colorado or home and that her roommate was becoming very possessive. Id.
28. Id, at 864.
29. 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1985). For a thoughtful analysis of the case, see
Note, Marital Status Classifications, supra note 18, at 122-34.
30. Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 530, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 527, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
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benefit involved was statutorily exempt from the antidiscrimination provision.3
In Bowers v. Hardwick,4 the Supreme Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment does not encompass a homosexual male's
right to engage in consensual sodomy. 5 In view of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Bowers, federal constitutional protection of homosexual relationships is
not likely to be forthcoming.
In a few notable state court cases, however, gay men and lesbians have been
able to procure benefits as the family members of their partners. In Braschi v.
Stahl Associates, 6 for example, New York's highest court ruled that a gay
man's partner qualified as a family member under the noneviction provision of
New York City's rent control law.37 A California court, in Donovan v. Work-
ers' Compensation Appeals Board,38 held that a decedent's homosexual part-
ner could claim death benefits if the facts demonstrated dependency. 9 On re-
mand, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board awarded Donovan benefits
as a dependent of his partner."'
While these rulings are victories for gay couples, they are exceptions to the
general rule that litigation fails to secure benefits for homosexual partners.
Although benefits may be obtained through litigation, these victories come at a
prohibitively high price. Litigation is expensive and time consuming. More-
over, the court in Braschi reached its decision that the two men constituted a
family only after examining the intimate details of their life together.4 1 The
facts the court found dispositive included the following: the exclusivity of the
relationship; its ten-year duration; the existence of joint bank accounts, safety
33. Id. at 530, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 419. The court concluded that "as a matter of federal and
state law, dental benefits under the state plan qualiflied] as fringe benefits exempt from marital
status discrimination." Id.
34. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
35. Id. at 192. In Bowers, Hardwick, an adult male, was charged with violating a Georgia
statute criminalizing sodomy after police caught him in his home engaging in sodomy with a
consenting male adult. The state did not pursue the charges against Hardwick. Hardwick then
challenged the constitutionality of the Georgia statute. The federal district court dismissed the
case, holding that Hardwick had failed to state a claim for relief. The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
finding that the statute violated Hardwick's fundamental rights.
36. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989). For a thoughtful discussion of
Braschi, see Recent Developments, Redefining the Family, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183
(1990).
37. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 213, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
38. 138 Cal. App. 3d 323, 187 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1982).
39. Id. at 328-29, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
40. See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1508,
1619 (1989) (citing Donovan v. County of Los Angeles, 73 LA 385-107, slip op. at 9 (Cal. Work-
ers' Comp. Appeals Bd., Opinion and Notice of Intention, Nov. 3, 1983)). The California Workers
Compensation Board eventually determined that the deceased worker's homosexual partner of 27
years was a "good faith" member of the employee's household and, therefore, entitled to receive
workers compensation benefits. Donovan v. County of Los Angeles, 73 LA 385-107, slip op. at 3
(Cal. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., Opinion and Order Denying Reconsideration, Jan. 24, 1984).
41. See Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 213, 543 N.E.2d 49, 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784,
790 (1989).
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deposit boxes and credit cards; that Braschi was his partner's life insurance
beneficiary; and that their families knew of their relationship.42
A test such as the one used in Braschi is not only intrusive, but few married
couples could meet its criteria. As one commentator noted, "There is some
unavoidable injustice in this; after all, many blood relatives share little or no
emotional commitment and indeed need demonstrate none in order to establish
their rights.""' In short, few gay and lesbian couples are likely to benefit from
the Braschi holding, considering its limited scope and its onerous criteria.
Aside from resorting to litigation as a means of obtaining benefits, gay
couples can draft legal documents that formalize the obligations of their rela-
tionship and inform third parties of their wishes. The ability of gay men and
lesbians to draft legally binding documents to protect their rights is also prob-
lematic. In theory, gay couples can draft cohabitation contracts which guaran-
tee equitable property division and financial support if their relationship
ends." Gay couples can also protect their rights in case of a medical emer-
gency or death by executing living wills, wills, or other documents that name
each other as insurance beneficiaries or that provide for durable powers of
attorney and funeral arrangements.'" Some states, however, will not recognize
cohabitation agreements between heterosexuals unless the partners put their
wishes in writing.' Even fewer states are likely to recognize such contracts
between homosexuals.' 7
Even if states enforce the written wishes of a homosexual couple, not all
couples can afford a lawyer.' 8 Thus, such solutions are likely to be accessible
only to people in higher income groups. Although self-help manuals are availa-
ble to assist partners in drafting contracts, some cohabitators are mistrustful
of the legal system, or are not aware that legal solutions exist to help them
structure their relationship.' 9 Further, binding contracts between the two part-
ners that contemplate emergencies or the end of their relationship are not the
42. Id. at 213, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
43. Note, Property Rights of Same-Sex Couples: Toward a New Definition of Family, 26 J.
FAM. L. 357, 367 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Property Rights of Same-Sex Couples].
44. See generally H. CURRY & D. CLIFFORD, supra note 23, at 3:1-2 (indicating that unmar-
ried partners should always draft contracts identifying partner's property when significant prop-
erty is involved).
45. See Recent Developments, Protecting the Nontraditional Couple in Times of Medical Cri-
ses, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 220, 229-34 (1989) [hereinafter Recent Developments, Medical Cri-
ses] (discussing methods by which nontraditional couples can express their wishes about health-
related decisions).
46. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 513.075-.076 (West Supp. 1990) (requiring a contract be-
tween a cohabiting man and woman to be in writing to be enforceable).
47. Cf H. CURRY & D. CLIFFORD, supra note 23, at 2:7 (noting that courts may refuse to
enforce contracts of homosexuals if they are perceived to be based upon sexual services or are
drafted in states with laws prohibiting sodomy).
48. See Ettelbrick & Stoddard, Gay Marriage: A Must or A Bust?, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at
8, 12.
49. See, e.g., H. CURRY & D. CLIFFORD, supra note 23 (a guide to legal problems unique to
gay and lesbian couples); T. IHARA & R. WARNER, THE LIVING TOGETHER KIT (5th ed. 1988).
[Vol. 40:417
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only benefits gay partners need. They also need the state to recognize their
relationship by bringing it "within the purview of the law . . . automatically
creat[ing] certain rights and duties in both parties.""0 Legal documents are
not a viable option for many couples, andthey are an incomplete alternative in
any event.
II. DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVES
At least seven municipalities have adopted ordinances or policies that ad-
dress inequitable treatment between married people and cohabitators.5' Cities
with such policies include Santa Cruz,52 West Hollywood,53 and Berkeley, Cal-
ifornia; 54 Takoma Park, Maryland;55 Madison, Wisconsin;5 6 Seattle, Washing-
ton;5 ' and New York, New York. 8 The initiatives explicitly adopt the lan-
guage of "domestic partners" or "domestic partnerships. ' 59
50. Note, Property Rights of Same-Sex Couples, supra note 43, at 359 (footnote omitted).
51. Minneapolis, Minnesota has also passed an ordinance providing a public registry for domes-
tic partners and employment benefits. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS NEWSLETTER,
Fall/Winter 1990, at 10. Ithaca, New York provides only a public registry for domestic partners.
See id. Washington, D.C.'s new family leave act includes domestic partners as family members.
See id.
Numerous private organizations and employers, including the American Psychological Associa-
tion, the Workers' Trust Insurance Company, and the Village Voice Newspaper, have also ex-
tended benefits to domestic partners. See LESBIAN RIGHTS PROJECT, PRESERVING AND PROTECT-
ING THE FAMILIES OF LESBIAN AND GAY MEN 10 n.46 (R. Achtenberg ed. 1986). Additionally,
the Board of Trustees of Stanford University recently elected to extend medical and housing bene-
fits to domestic partners of university employees. New Stanford Policy Backs Rights of Gay Un-
married Couples, Chicago Trib., Oct. 2, 1990, § 1, at 4, col. 1. While such developments are to be
applauded, the focus here is on governmental extension of benefits.
52. Santa Cruz, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet and Affidavit of Domestic Part-
nership (1985).
53. WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., ORDINANCE 22 (Feb. 26, 1985).
54. Berkeley, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1987); Berkeley, Cal., Affidavit of
Domestic Partnership (1986).
55. Master Agreement between City of Takoma Park, Md., and the American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO Council 67 and Local 3399 (Sept. 1, 1987 to
Aug. 31, 1989). The City of Takoma Park has entered into a new agreement with its union. The
new union contract contains the same benefits for domestic partners as discussed in this Article.
Telephone interview with Karen Mitchell, President of Local 3399, American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees (Apr. 19, 1990).
56. MADISON, WIs., GENERAL ORDINANCES §§ 3.36, 28.03 (1988).
57. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE 114648 (Aug. 18, 1989).
58. New York, N.Y., Executive Order 123 (Aug. 7, 1989).
59. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE 114648 (Aug. 18, 1989) (stating that the
ordinance is designed to "facilitate the identification of an individual as the spouse or 'domestic
partner' of an . . . employee"); Berkeley, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1987)
(using the term "domestic partner" in its title). But see MADISON, WIs., GENERAL ORDINANCE §
3.36(15)(a)2.g (1988) (extending sick and bereavement leave to Madison city employees when
there is an illness or a death of a "family partner").
Much of the legal scholarship concerning cohabitation also uses the term "domestic partners."
See, e.g., Bonnell, The Domestic Partnership Act: Cohabitants' Property Rights, 2 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 49 (1979) (proposing The Domestic Partnership Act, which designates "domestic
1991]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:417
New York's policy provides a typical definition of, and qualifications for
becoming, domestic partners. New York City's Executive Order No. 123, enti-
tled "Bereavement Leave for City Employees Who Are Members of a Domes-
tic Partnership," states:
Domestic partners are two people, both of whom are eighteen years of age
or older and neither of whom is married, who have a close and committed
personal relationship involving shared responsibilities, who have lived to-
gether for a period of one year or more on a continuous basis at the time of
registration, and who have registered as domestic partners. 60
Eligibility for domestic partnership in most cities is limited to the partners
of city employees. New York City, Santa Cruz, Berkeley, Madison, and Seat-
tle impose this restriction. 61 In Takoma Park, and West Hollywood, some of
the benefits are available to all city residents who meet the other criteria for
partnership. 2
In most cities, couples seeking recognition as domestic partners file affidavits
with the city stating their eligibility for partnership." The cities provide the
affidavits. Typically, the affidavits require the partners to assert that they live
together, are not married, are not barred from marriage under state consan-
guinity requirements, and are "each other's sole domestic partner. '" In order
partnership" as an association of persons to carry on a joint household); Folberg & Buren, supra
note 16, at 480 (using the term "domestic partnership" to describe a property-type relationship
between unmarried partners allowing for equitable distribution of familial property); Recent De-
velopments, Medical Crises, supra note 45, at 223 (using the term "domestic partners" when
referring to cohabiting couples).
60. New York, N.Y., Executive Order 123 (Aug. 7, 1989).
61. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE 114648 (1989) (limiting the benefits to "of-
ficers and employees" of the city); MADISON, Wis., GENERAL ORDINANCE § 3.36 (1988) (granting
various "equal opportunities" to individuals regardless of their "alternative family status"); New
York, N.Y., Executive Order 123 (Aug. 7, 1989) (granting city employees bereavement leave in
the event of a domestic partner's death); Berkeley, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet
(1987) (indicating that the policy adopted extends benefits to "domestic partners of its employ-
ees"); Santa Cruz, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1990) (extending benefits to
domestic partners of city employees).
62. See, e.g., WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., ORDINANCE 22 (Feb. 26, 1985) (providing housing
rights, and jail and hospital visitation rights to the domestic partners of all residents); TAKOMA
PARK. MD., ORDINANCE 1986 § 6-81 (Nov. 10, 1986) (providing certain housing rights and bene-
fits to tenants, including domestic partners).
63. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4.30.020 (1989). The Seattle ordinance provides
that "[t]he documentation sufficient to qualify ... shall consist of an affidavit." The affidavit may
be completed by a married person, or by a person "participating in a domestic partnership," with
distinct affidavit requirements for married and unmarried applicants. Id.
64. See, e.g., Santa Cruz, Cal., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership (1985) (paragraph 5 of're-
quiring that partners "not be related by blood closer than would bar marriage"; paragraph 6
requiring that partners affirm that "we are each other's sole domestic partners"). For an example
of a Domestic Partnership Ordinance, see infra Appendix A. For an example of an Affidavit of
Domestic Partnership, see infra Appendix B.
Consanguinity means persons descending from the same immediate family. H. KRAUSE, FAMILY
LAW § 3.5 (1986). A marital consanguinity requirement prevents close relatives from marrying
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to qualify, the partners must be eighteen years old, and must be competent to
contract. 5 The parties must also assert that they "share the common necessi-
ties of life" and are responsible for each other's welfare.66 The partners may
be either of the opposite sex or of the same sex.
67
The affidavits not only require the partners to provide particular informa-
tion, but they also inform the partners of, and bind them to, specific obliga-
tions. The partners promise to notify the city within a specified number of
days if they terminate the partnership.68 They promise to file a "Statement of
Termination of Domestic Partnership" with the city upon termination of the
relationship and to mail a copy of the completed form to the other partner.69
After termination of the partnership, the partners agree not to enter into an-
other domestic partnership for up to six months after a Statement of Termina-
tion has been filed with the city.70 Significantly, the partners affirm they "un-
derstand that any persons/employer/company who suffer any loss because of a
false statement contained in an Affidavit of Domestic Partnership may bring a
civil action against [them] to recover their losses including reasonable attor-
ney's fees."17 1
The benefits available to domestic partners vary among cities. Berkeley,
Santa Cruz, and West Hollywood extend health care benefits to the domestic
partners of their employees.72 West Hollywood's health care benefits include
medical, dental, and vision insurance.7 . Some of these same cities, along with
Seattle, Takoma Park, New York, and Madison, provide city employees with
bereavement leave.7 ' If the domestic partner or a member of the domestic
and falling under the purview of statutes criminalizing incest. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Incest § 7 (1968).
For a discussion of domestic partnership consanguinity requirements, see infra text accompanying
notes 111-15.
65. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership (1986) (paragraph 4, requiring
applicants to affirm that they are 18 years of age, and paragraph 5, requiring that they are compe-
tent to contract).
66. See Santa Cruz, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet and Affidavit of Domestic
Partnership (1990).
67. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1987) (stating the pur-
pose of the policy is to equalize benefits of domestic partners of city employees whether unmarried
by choice or because they are barred by law from marrying).
68. See, e.g., Santa Cruz, Cal., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership (1990) (paragraph 3 giving
an employee 30 days to notify the city of changes in circumstances attested to in the affidavit).
69. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership (1986) (paragraph 8 providing
that "change[s] in circumstances" will be cause for notifying the city, which will terminate the
domestic partnership).
70. See, e.g., id.
71. id.
72. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1987); Santa Cruz, Cal.,
Affidavit of Domestic Partnership (1990); West Hollywood, Cal., Domestic Partnership Informa-
tion Sheet (1989).
73. See Speech by Mary Tyson, City Clerk of West Hollywood, California, given at public
forum (Apr. 24, 1989).
74. See SEATTLE. WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE 114648 § 4.30.00 (1989); MADISON, Wis., GEN-
ERAL ORDINANCE § 3.36 (1988); New York, N.Y., Executive Order 123 (Aug. 7, 1989); Master
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partner's immediate family dies, then the employee may leave work without
penalty." Berkeley, Madison, Seattle, and Takoma Park also provide sick
leave.7 6 When the employee's partner or a member of the partner's immediate
family is ill, the employee may stay home to provide care without penalty.7 In
Takoma Park, and West Hollywood, domestic partners also receive some pro-
tection under their housing ordinances.7 8 West Hollywood's ordinance provides
the most extensive benefits by providing for health-care facility and city jail
visitation.7 9
The methods by which the cities extend benefits to domestic partnerships
also vary. In Santa Cruz, West Hollywood, Berkeley, and New York, the cit-
ies adopted new employment policies to implement the domestic partnership
benefit programs. 80 In Santa Cruz, the city adopted the policy after negotia-
tions with the Service Employees Union and the Management Association.81
In New York City, the mayor issued an executive order adopting bereavement
leave . 2 The cities of Seattle, and Madison extend their benefits pursuant to
ordinances.8" Takoma Park provides partners with benefits under an ordi-
nance, but employees receive benefits pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement between the city and its employees' union.84 In addition to its em-
ployment policy, West Hollywood also has an ordinance extending visitation
Agreement between City of Takoma Park, Md., and the American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO Council 67 and Local 3399 § 7 (Sept. 1, 1987 to Aug. 31,
1989); see also Letter from Daniel Boggan, City Manager of Berkeley, Cal., to Members of the
City Council (Nov. 20, 1984) (indicating that bereavement leave would be available to city em-
ployees in the event of the death of a domestic partner).
75. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE 114648 § 4.30.00 (1989).
76. See id. § 4.30.10; MADISON. Wis., GENERAL ORDINANCES § 3.36 (1988); Berkeley, Cal.,
Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1987); Master Agreement between City of Takoma
Park, Md., and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
Council 67 and Local 3399 § 7(e) (Sept. 1, 1987 to Aug. 31, 1989).
77. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE 114648 § 4.24.035 (1989).
78. See Speech by Mary Tyson, City Clerk of West Hollywood, California, given at public
forum (Apr. 24, 1989) (indicating that domestic partners receive the benefits of the city's rent
stabilization ordinance). The Takoma Park Housing Code defines domestic partners, includes the
term domestic partner in the definition of family member, and uses the term family member in
housing provisions related, for example, to tenant opportunity to purchase and offers for sale pro-
visions. TAKOMA PARK, MD., HOUSING CODE Art. 8 § 6-81 (1986).
79. See WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., ORDINANCE 22 §§ 7-8 (1985).
80. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1986) (documenting the
adoption of a city policy extending certain benefits, such as medical benefits and sick leave bene-
fits, to city employees and their domestic partners).
81. See Santa Cruz, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1990) (introducing domes-
tic partnership initiatives as a policy resulting from an agreement between the City Service Em-
ployees Union, and the city).
82. See New York, N.Y., Executive Order 123 (Aug. 7, 1989).
83. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE 114648 (Aug. 18, 1989); MADISON, WiS., GENERAL
ORDINANCE § 3.36 (1988).
84. See supra note 55 (citing a collective bargaining agreement including domestic partnership
benefits).
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rights to domestic partners."8 While the particulars of the various domestic
partnership initiatives may vary, the initiatives represent a unified concept: an
effort to equalize the rights and privileges of cohabiting couples regardless of
their sexual preferences. An analysis of some of the issues raised by domestic
partnership initiatives follows.
III. DISCUSSION
Domestic partnership initiatives are an effective means for conferring bene-
fits on unmarried partners. As they presently exist, however, domestic partner-
ship initiatives are very limited in scope. Furthermore, municipalities are lim-
ited in their ability to extend the scope of the initiatives due to federal and
state preemption concerns.
On a theoretical level, advocates of domestic partnership initiatives are di-
vided over the purpose domestic partnership initiatives should serve. Domestic
partnership initiatives are typically viewed as either a tacit recognition of ho-
mosexual marriage or as a recognition of alternative family relationships. The
perceived purpose of domestic partnership initiatives will impact the extent to
which they are adopted in the future by municipalities, states, or nationally.
A. Advantages of Domestic Partnership Initiatives
Couples who register as domestic partners receive numerous benefits. The
partners are eligible for the specific entitlements listed in the initiatives. They
also receive the benefits that society conveys upon a legally recognized
relationship.
The tangible benefits domestic partners receive include entitlements such as
health benefits or hospital visitation that are readily available to married
couples and traditional family members."6 Under a domestic partnership initi-
ative providing hospital visitation, the Kowalski 7 situation could have been
avoided. If Sharon Kowalski and Karen Thompson could have registered as a
domestic partnership, then Thompson would have been able to visit Kowalski
in the hospital over the objections of Kowalski's father. Although ultimately
successful, the extensive litigation in the Braschil8 case could have been
avoided if New York's rent control law had explicitly included homosexual
couples within its definition of qualifying families.
While domestic partnership initiatives require couples to register with the
city, this requirement is less burdensome than hiring an attorney to draft com-
85. See WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., ORDINANCE 22 §§ 7-8 (1986); see also TAKOMA PARK, MD.,
ORDINANCE No. 1986 (1986) (giving domestic partriers the same housing rights as "family
members").
86. See supra notes 5-16 and accompanying text (listing many rights unique to married
couples).
87. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1085 (1986). For a discussion of Kowalski, see supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
88. Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989). For
a discussion of Braschi, see supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
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plex legal documents.8 9 Moreover, the requirement is no more onerous than
requiring heterosexual couples to procure a license and a blood test before
marrying.
Although the receipt of entitlements is crucial to many partners, another
benefit of domestic partnership initiatives is that they provide social sanction
of the partners' relationship. The recognition of domestic partnerships as a
family entity that should be protected and fostered is a significant develop-
ment. Not only might such social recognition curtail discrimination against
domestic partners, but it also acknowledges that a relationship exists.90
Social sanctioning of domestic partnerships in and of itself is valued by do-
mestic partners, particularly by gay and lesbian couples.91 That is, partners
value the ability of their relationship to be recognized by the state, even with-
out the receipt of benefits. Indeed, the City Clerk of West Hollywood reported
that as of December 5, 1989, many of its 240 registrants for domestic partner-
ships "do not even reside in West Hollywood and several do not even reside in
the State of California."9" The Clerk stated that the "majority of couples have
filed [for domestic partnerships] because it gives them an opportunity to make
a public commitment to one another and receive a modicum of validity from a
public agency."98
The public affirmation aspect of domestic partnership initiatives is miti-
gated, however, by the confidentiality provisions included in some cities' affida-
vits. The Santa Cruz affidavit, for example, provides that "this information
will be held confidential and will be subject to disclosure only upon [the part-
ners'] express written authorization or pursuant to court order."9 ' Employee
records are often kept confidential, and the sensitivity reflected in these poli-
cies is admirable. Nevertheless, it is ironic to provide a device that affirms the
existence of a relationship and then keeps the affirmation confidential. Presum-
89. Cities provide the affidavit at nominal cost. See, e.g., Speech by Mary Tyson, City Clerk of
West Hollywood, California, given at public forum (Apr. 24, 1989) (indicating there is a $15.00
fee for filing a domestic partnership application with affidavit, and a $5.00 fee for filing a notice of
termination). But see Berkeley, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1987) (recom-
mending that applicants consult an attorney about the legal ramifications of the domestic partner-
ship affidavit before completing it).
90. E.g., Ettelbrick & Stoddard, supra note 48, at 8, 12 (viewing homosexuals' commitment to
the right to marry as equivalent to seeking to be free from discrimination).
91. See Gorney, Making It Official. The Law & Live-Ins: San Francisco Recognizes the Do-
mestic Partner, Wash. Post, Jul. 5, 1989, at Cl, col. 1. In fact, a gay couple interviewed felt that
the city would recognize them as a "unit" once they registered as domestic partners. Id. at C6,
col. 4.
92. Speech by Mary Tyson, City Clerk of West Hollywood, California, given at public forum
(Apr. 24, 1989).
93. Id.
94. Santa Cruz, Cal., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership (1990). The initiatives of New York
City and Berkeley also contain confidentiality provisions. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal., Affidavit of
Domestic Partnership (1986) (stating in paragraph 11 that the affidavit information is confidential
and subject to disclosure only by court order); New York, N.Y., Executive Order 123 (Aug. 7,
1989) (providing that any information concerning a domestic partner's entitlement to bereavement
leave "must be kept confidential").
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ably if two people are living together and reveal their relationship to the city,
they are not predominantly concerned with maintaining the confidentiality of
their relationship.9" In providing for confidentiality, the affidavit contains an
implicit recognition of continued discrimination and of the limited ability of
the city to solve the problem.
B. Practical Issues
While domestic partnership initiatives are an affirmative step in the direc-
tion of equitable treatment for homosexual couples, they have practical limita-
tions. The objections of private parties whose cooperation is needed to imple-
ment the initiatives may limit the cities' ability to provide even a small range
of entitlements. Additionally, cities have limited power to affect state entitle-
ments. Thus, protections and entitlements provided by most cities may not
have much actual substance. Moreover, not only are cities limited in their abil-
ity to solve social problems with legislation, but the initiatives may be pre-
empted by state and federal law.
1. Private Cooperation
Cities may enact domestic partnership initiatives, but the cooperation of pri-
vate parties is necessary to implement them. On the rare occasion that a city is
willing to extend benefits to homosexual couples, its citizens may not be. The
Board of Supervisors in San Francisco passed domestic partnership legislation
on June 22, 1989.96 The San Francisco domestic partnership initiative prohib-
ited discrimination against domestic partners in the city and county of San
Francisco, 97 and extended hospital visitation rights to domestic partners. 98 The
San Francisco initiative was opposed by a slim voting majority of city resi-
dents who succeeded in getting it repealed in a November 1989 referendum. 99
Domestic partnership initiatives are likely only to be passed in cities with an
active, vocal, organized, and sizable gay community. Indeed, one reason initia-
95. As Mary Ann Glendon states, "Concealment [of domestic partnership status] has sociologi-
cal significance because it deprives attestation to the relevant community one of the elements of
conduct sociologists would call 'marriage.'" See Glendon, supra note 23, at 684.
96. See San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance Amending Article 40 of the Police Code §§ 4001-4010
(Jun. 22, 1989) (proposed ordinance) (repealed by referendum Nov. 7, 1989).
97. Id. § 4001.
98. Id. § 4007(b).
99. See, e.g., Sandalow & Herscher, Prop S Defeat A Serious Blow to Gay Power, San Fran-
cisco Chron., Nov. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 6 (reporting that voters defeated the initiative by a vote of
51% to 49%).
Vocal opposition to the initiative focused on its costs to the city. See Bodovitz, Domestic Part-
ner Debate May Key on Economics, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 16, 1989, at A4, col. 1. Of
course, since the initiative only permitted hospital visitation for partners, it was virtually cost-free
to the city.
A new version of a domestic partnership ordinance was on the ballot in San Francisco for the
November 1990 election. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS NEWSLETTER, Fall/Winter
1990, at 12.
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tives are being adopted at the city level is that some cities have significant gay
and lesbian communities.100 As the San Francisco referendum indicates, how-
ever, even an active gay community may not be able to defeat organized resis-
tance to domestic partnership initiatives. Considering that liberal estimates
place the homosexual population at ten percent of the total population,101 their
power as a state or national political force is diluted. Heterosexual
cohabitators do not appear to have any organized political movement that
could contribute significant support to implementing domestic partnership
initiatives.
In cities which have managed to enact domestic partnership initiatives, pri-
vate cooperation is still needed to implement them. The initiatives of West
Hollywood, Santa Cruz, and Berkeley, for example, extend health insurance
benefits to the domestic partners of city employees.'0 2 A city's decision to pro-
vide insurance to the domestic partners of its employees is meaningful only
when private insurers contracting with the city are willing to extend coverage
to partners.
The AIDS crisis, heterosexism, and the increased cost of extending coverage
to a third party discourages insurers from agreeing to provide coverage to do-
mestic partners. 0 3 If private insurers do not provide coverage for partners,
they cannot be compelled to do so even by state laws prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of marital status." 4 While insurers stand to lose the business
of a few municipalities if they refuse to insure domestic partners, the reality is
that the loss of this relatively small amount of business is not a sufficient in-
centive to compel insurance companies to provide benefits to domestic part-
ners. Indeed, the City of West Hollywood failed to procure an insurer for its
extension of benefits after approaching twelve insurers during a three-year
search.'0 The city is therefore providing insurance coverage on its own.' 0 6
100. See generally Zonana, Gay Agenda Takes Beating-Even In San Francisco, L.A. Times,
Nov. 9, 1989, at Al, col. I (discussing the passage of only one gay rights measure when such
measures were on the ballots in the three California cities of San Francisco, Irvine, and Concord).
101. See Saltus, Survey Finds Conservative Sexual Habits in US, Boston Globe, Feb. 19, 1990,
at 3, col. 2.
102. See Berkeley, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1987); Santa Cruz, Cal.,
Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1990); Speech by Mary Tyson, City Clerk of West
Hollywood, California, given at public forum (Apr. 24, 1989).
103. The City Manager of Berkeley reported in 1984 that there was no evidence that domestic
partners would be more expensive to insure than spouses. Speech by Daniel Boggan Jr., Proposed
Policy Establishing "Domestic Partnerships" 12 (Presented to the Mayor and City Council of
The City of Berkeley, Cal., July 17, 1984); see H. CURRY & D. CLIFFORD. supra note 23, at 4:13
(summarizing the problem cities with domestic partnership initiatives have procuring medical in-
surance for employees). Cf Cox, supra note 6, at 28-31 (explaining how insurers choose insureds).
104. See Hinman v. Department of Personnel, 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410
(1985). For a summary of the case, see supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
105. See Russell, West Hollywood Will Insure Partners of Single Employees, L.A. Times,
Feb. 22, 1989, § 2, at 3, col. 5; see also H. CURRY & D. CLIFFORD, supra note 23, at 4:13
(reporting that "no health insurance carrier for Berkeley ... has been willing to extend coverage
to 'domestic partners' except in dental insurance"); Berkeley, Cal., Domestic Partnership Informa-
tion Sheet (1987) ("Currently, dental coverage is the only insured benefit available.").
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2. Determining Who Qualifies as a Domestic Partner
Many commentators, including those sympathetic to procuring benefits for
homosexual couples, have criticized domestic partnership initiatives based on
the indeterminacy of establishing who qualifies as a partner.107 Opponents
claim that mere roommates can register as domestic partners.108 They empha-
size that the failure to require a sexual relationship between the partners
means that any two people living together can register as partners.109
This criticism is generally unfounded. To the extent that the initiatives do
not explicitly require the partners to be in a sexual relationship with one an-
other, then perhaps mere roommates can register as partners. 110 The consan-
guinity requirement, however, indicates that the cities assume that at least
some partners are involved in a sexual relationship. Otherwise, the require-
ment does not seem to serve any purpose."'
The purpose of consanguinity requirements is to prevent incestuous mar-
In discussing the extension of benefits to partners in Seattle, the manager of King County Med-
ical Blue Shield's underwriting department stated that Blue Shield would decline to offer coverage
to domestic partners. He stated, "It's a can of worms because we can't quantify the risks." Live-in
Partners Could Get Health Benefits, U.P.I. (May 8, 1989).
106. See Russell, West Hollywood Will Insure Partners of Single Employees, L.A. Times,
Feb. 22, 1989, § 2, at 3, col. 5.
107. See H. CURRY & D. CLIFFORD, supra note 23, at 4:13 (raising the question, "What quali-
fies someone as a domestic partner?"); Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom, NEw REPUBLIc, Aug.
28, 1989 at 20 ("The concept of domestic partnership could open a Pandora's box of litigation and
subjective decision making about who qualifies.").
The Hinman court also discussed the practical problems involved in determining benefit eligibil-
ity for homosexual partners:
The responsible agencies would have to establish standards which would reach the
very foundations of the privacy rights of both homosexual partners in order to prop-
erly determine whether the relationship meets some arbitrary standard equating with
marriage, and still exclude other unmarried non-spouses, such as roommates, ac-
quaintances or companions. Additionally, it would bear down unfairly on those un-
married homosexual [s] ... who would prefer to keep their sexual orientation a private
matter. The great potential for different opinions by the employer, insurers and unions
as to who is an eligible homosexual partner could expose all parties to allegations of
discriminatory treatment and the making public of any administrative examination of
the sexual relationships involved.
Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 528, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 418 (citation and footnote omitted).
108. See Charen, Gay Couples Put Knife to Idea of Family, NEWSDAY, July 10, 1989, at 44.
109. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra.note 107, at 20 (giving various examples of domestic partnership
arrangements where partners have a nonsexual relationship, such as an elderly woman and her
live-in nurse, a pair of seminarians, two close students, and so forth).
110. New York's Bereavement Policy requires domestic partners be in a "close and committed
personal relationship," but does not mention whether the relationship is expected to be sexual.
New York, N.Y., Executive Order 123 § 1 (Aug. 8, 1989).
111. The consanguinity requirement in most domestic partnership agreements is probably in-
tended to prevent applicants from violating laws against incest. See supra note 64 and accompany-
ing text (discussing domestic partnership initiative consanguinity requirements). Domestic part-
ners typically must swear that they "are not related by blood closer than would bar marriage."
See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE 114648 § 4.30.020(A)(2)(d) (1989).
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riages and marriages where the proximity of the blood relationship could pro-
duce children with genetic deficiencies.1 ' Incest, and until relatively recently,
the production of children, can only occur if a couple is engaging in sexual
relations. Many partners who do not engage in sexual relations will meet the
initiatives' consanguinity requirement. On the other hand, cousins and other
extended family members who do not engage in sexual relations, but who need
the protection of the initiatives will not meet the consanguinity requirement.
Thus, the presence of the restriction indicates an assumption that many of the
partners will be engaging in sexual relations.
The failure of domestic partnership initiatives to require the parties to be
involved in a sexual relationship may be dictated by state law. If domestic
partnership affidavits constitute contracts between cohabitants, then requiring
partners to be in a sexual relationship will make the contract void under state
law prohibiting contracts with meretricious consideration. 18 Cohabitants,
therefore, must contract as partners rather than as lovers in order to have a
binding agreement.1 4 The irony is that married couples supposedly do not
have a binding marital contract until they engage in sexual intercourse. 115
The affidavit the partners must sign before being recognized as domestic
partners will decrease the likelihood of mere roommates registering, regardless
of whether the partners are engaged in a sexual relationship. Not only does
the affidavit contain requirements the partners must meet before they qualify
for benefits, but it also requires each of the partners to swear that they plan to
remain together as a couple indefinitely, are responsible for each other's wel-
fare and share the common necessities of life.116
The concern about mere roommates registering as partners seems to reflect
a concern about people fraudulently registering as domestic partners. The affi-
davit the partners must sign, however, mitigates the potential for fraud. If the
partners commit fraud in signing the affidavit, they subject themselves to suit
by any party suffering losses due to their fraud.1 7 Although not defined in the
affidavits, presumably fraud in this context would be found where the parties
signing the affidavit registered solely to obtain benefits, rather than because
they were in a mutually committed relationship.118
112. H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS, 28-31 (2d ed. 1983).
113. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 670-671, 557 P.2d 106, 113, 134 Cal. Rptr.
815, 822 (1976) (stating that although the existence or contemplation of a sexual relationship will
not invalidate any agreements between parties, such agreements will fail to the extent that they
rest upon consideration of meretricious sexual services).
114. Cf H. CURRY & D. CLIFFORD, supra note 23, at 2:7 (warning contracting cohabitants to
refer to themselves as partners, not lovers).
115. See 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 13 (1948) ("The theory on which [an unconsummated] mar-
riage is invalidated is not that there was an original incapacity to contract, but that there has been
an entire and complete failure of the consideration of the marriage contract."(footnote omitted)).
116. See, e.g., Santa Cruz, Cal., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership (1990).
117. See, e.g., id. (specifying that anyone who suffers loss due to false affidavit statements or
unnotified change in circumstances may bring a civil action against the partners to recover the
loss).
118. See TAKOMA PARK, MD., HOUSING CODE 1986 § 6-81(a) (1986) ("A person is not a
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The fear of fraud by some partnerships should not justify failure to recog-
nize domestic partnerships. Heterosexual couples claiming to be married gen-
erally do not have to prove they are married in order to obtain benefits.119
Rather, the cities or other entities extending them benefits simply assume that
they are telling the truth. Similarly, people registering as domestic partners
should not be assumed to be dishonest in numbers greater than any other pop-
ulation, particularly after signing an affidavit. Even assuming that some of the
parties signing the affidavits will commit fraud, the benefits of city recognition
of domestic partnerships outweigh the risks.1 20
3. Increased Cost of Providing Benefits to Domestic Partners
Opponents of the initiatives also claim that extending insurance benefits to
domestic partners will be too costly for the municipalities. They argue that
there will be an exponential growth in the amount of benefits claimed, particu-
larly due to covering male homosexuals who are at a high risk for contracting
AIDS. 2' In turn, opponents claim that such growth in the demand for benefits
will increase the cost of the benefits available to those already receiving
them.122
While concerns about the increased costs of providing benefits are under-
standable, they seem to be based on troubling assumptions. There is no reason,
for example, to assume that domestic partners will be ill more often than
spouses or traditional family members. Therefore, benefits for covered partners
should cost no more than benefits for traditional family members.' 2 The gay
male population still has the highest incidence of AIDS, but the growth of new
cases is declining."" Of course, to the extent that a high-risk group concept
still applies to AIDS, a further irony is that lesbians are the least likely seg-
'domestic partner' if he/she has moved in with the [partner] for the purpose of obtaining rights
under this Article.").
119. See Boggan, supra note 103, at 5, 13; see also SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE 114648
§ 4.30.020(A)(1) (1989) (requiring a married employee seeking benefits to swear only that he or
she is married).
120. See Letter from Abbe Land, Mayor of West Hollywood, California, to Sandy Sturges,
domestic partnership forum audience member (May 10, 1989) (indicating that abuse of the do-
mestic partnership ordinance will not be tolerated because its purpose is to recognize sincere
relationships).
121. See Bodovitz, Domestic Partner Debate May Key on Economics, San Francisco Chron.,
Oct. 16, 1989, at A4, col. 1; D'Souza, From Tolerance to Subsidy, Wash. Times, July 10, 1989,
at D1, col. 1.
122. See, e.g.. Bodovitz, Domestic Partner Debate May Key on Economics, San Francisco
Chron., Oct. 16, 1989, at A4, col. 1.
123. See Boggan, supra note 103, at 12.
124. See, e.g., Fisher, AIDS Cases to Grow, But at a Slower Pace, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Jan.
15, 1990, at 24 (Life & Health/Financial Services ed.) (reporting a slowing in the rate of AIDS
among homosexual men); Schachner, Experts Reject Dire Aids Projections: Model Predicts Huge
Rise in Deaths, BUSINESS INSURANCE, Feb. 12, 1990, at 3 (noting that researchers and insurers
believe the rate of the spread of AIDS among homosexuals males has peaked).
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ment of the population to contract the disease. 12 5 This arguably makes them
preferable to sexually active heterosexuals as insureds.
Arguments about the perceived cost of domestic partnership initiatives also
seem to assume that extending benefits to spouses and traditional family mem-
bers is somehow cost free. Not only is this not true as an empirical matter, but
such benefits are partially paid through the contributions of unmarried em-
ployees whose partners receive no benefits.1 26 The objection to extending bene-
fits to partners appears to be based more on the type of relationships a city
should protect, rather than on the costs of the benefits provided to partners.
4. Obligations Created by Registering as Domestic Partners
Upon registering as a domestic partnership, the partners create enforceable
obligations between the partnership and third parties and potentially between
one another. Third parties are granted causes of action against the partners
under the provisions of the domestic partnership affidavit. 12 Thus, the part-
ners do have obligations to those parties extending them benefits.22 The provi-
sions authorizing civil actions for recovery of losses and reasonable attorneys'
fees under most of the initiatives, however, do not indicate how the liability
should be allocated among the partners.1'2  The liability provisions do not call
for joint and several liability or contribution."'
The provisions also are ambiguous as to the extent that parties bringing
private actions to collect the debts of one partner by suing the other can rely
on statements made in the affidavit of domestic partnership. The cities evi-
dently do not intend state partnership law to govern the situation. In fact, the
West Hollywood ordinance provides that "[tihis Chapter does not make the
California Uniform Partnership Act .. . applicable to domestic
partnerships."''
Opponents of extending benefits to domestic partners also argue that the
partners are not required to support each other financially like married peo-
ple.' 3 2 In most cities, the partners must affirm under penalty of perjury that
125. See AIDS News, MEDICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN SEXUALITY, June 1989, at 31 (reporting
two probable cases of female-to-female HIV transmission in all AIDS literature).
126. See Boggan, supra note 103, at 1-2.
127. Berkeley's Affidavit of Domestic Partnership contains a paragraph providing that the part-
ners "understand that any persons/employer/company who suffer any loss because of false state-
ments ... may bring a civil action against [the partners]." Berkeley, Cal., Affidavit of Domestic
Partnership (1986).
128. See Note, Property Rights of Same-Sex Couples, supra note 43, at 359 n.15.
129. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership (1986) (indicating that part-
ners, together, may be civilly liable based upon false statements made in the affidavit).
130. Id.
131. WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE 22 § 6 (Feb. 26, 1985).
132. See, e.g., Elvin, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1989, at A14, col. 4 (arguing
that in addition to the adverse tax consequences marriage presents, married persons are unable to
qualify for a variety of subsidized programs on the basis of one spouse's income); D'Souza, From
Tolerance to Subsidy, Wash. Times, Jul. 10, 1989, at Dl, col. I ("If one wishes to inherit the life
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they are responsible for each other's welfare and common necessities of life.133
While this type of language is ambiguous, it does indicate that by signing the
affidavit the partners are not only registering with the city, but are also enter-
ing into a potentially enforceable agreement with each other.
In contemplation of these complex issues, Berkeley's "Domestic Partnership
Information Sheet" warns partners signing an Affidavit of Domestic Partner-
ship "that this declaration may have potential legal implications under Cali-
fornia law which has recognized that non-marital cohabiting couples may pri-
vately contract with respect to the financial obligations of their
relationship."184 Perhaps ironically, several of the information sheets also ad-
vise partners to consult an attorney regarding the potential legal effects of the
affidavit.135 Married individuals certainly are not warned to consult attorneys
prior to taking their vows. Indeed, they are discouraged from considering the
legal aspects of marriage. 36
In its proposed domestic partnership ordinance, San Francisco attempted to
mitigate the potential problem of domestic partnerships creating enforceable
liabilities between the partners. Section 4004(a) of its ordinance stated:
Neither this Article nor the filing of a Statement of Domestic Partnership
shall create any legal rights or duties from one of the parties to the other
other than the legal rights and duties specifically created by this Chapter or
other ordinances or resolutions of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors
which specifically refer to Domestic Partnership."'
The desire not to create legal obligations between partners is understanda-
ble, particularly if they do not understand the implications of signing the affi-
davit. Nevertheless, such a disclaimer seems troubling. If the idea of domestic
partnership initiatives is to recognize the commitment two people have made
to one another, then it seems problematic to claim within the same initiative
that the partners have no enforceable duties to one another.
C. Federalism: The Limitations of Local Government
Legislative enactments by municipalities are subject to the dictates of state
insurance benefits of one's homosexual partner, isn't is only fair that one should bear joint respon-
sibility for paying his medical expenses if he suffers from AIDS?").
133. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 114648 § 4.30.020 (1989) (requiring partners to
swear that they are "responsible for each other's common welfare").
134. Berkeley, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1987). Santa Cruz's information
sheet contains identical language. Santa Cruz, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet
(1990).
135. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1987).
136. Cf. W. O'DONNELL & D. JONES, THE LAW oF MARRIAGE AND MARITAL ALTERNATIVES
176 (1982) (describing premarital, or antenuptial agreements as "catalysts in destroying a union
before it begins").
137. San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance Amending Article 40 of the Police Code § 4004(a) (June
22, 1989) (proposed ordinance) (repealed by referendum Nov. 7, 1989).
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and federal law.' 8 Any city initiative is vulnerable to a claim of preemption.
That is, a city is subject to a claim that state or federal law prohibits the city's
ability to legislate on a particular issue.'39 Moreover, even if an initiative is not
preempted by state and federal statutes, it may interact with those statutes in
ways that may disadvantage, domestic partners.' 4
Preemption issues concerning domestic partnership initiatives could arise if
third parties affected by the initiatives challenge them. A wide range of poten-
tial plaintiffs could attack the initiatives. The West Hollywood ordinance, for
example, provides domestic partners with health-care facility visitation
rights.' 4 If traditional family members object to a partner's visitation, as in
the Kowalski case," 2 then they could challenge the validity of the ordi-
nance.' The West Hollywood ordinance also protects domestic partners
under its Rent Stabilization ordinance."' A landlord, hostile to the ordinance's
protections, could challenge its validity, as in the Braschi case." 5
1. State Preemption
Opponents could conceivably make state law challenges to domestic partner-
ship initiatives based on at least three theories. First, an initiative might be
challenged as being beyond the city's authority to enact legislation of local
concern. Second, an initiative might be attacked as contrary to state law.
Third, domestic partnership initiatives are vulnerable to preemption by the
state legislature which could overrule them with contrary state legislation.
138. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1062-63 (1980) (describ-
ing the legal powerlessness of American cities).
139. See Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HARV. L. REV.
737, 737-38 (1959) [hereinafter Note, Statutes and Ordinances] (indicating that municipal legis-
lative powers are wholly controlled by state legislatures);, see, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation Comm'n, 460 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (setting forth various ways
in which Congress can preempt state authority to make laws).
140. State antisodomy laws, for example, could be construed to prevent cohabiting homosexual
couples from receiving domestic partnership benefits. See infra notes 164-75 and accompanying
text.
141. WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., ORDINANCE 22 § 7 (Feb. 26, 1985). Under the ordinance,
health care facilities include "hospitals, convalescent facilities or other long-term care facilities."
Id.
142. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1085 (1986). For a discussion of the Kowalski case, see supra text accompanying notes 26-
28.
143. See Cox, supra note 6, at 49 (arguing that "[u]nder local legislation, a problem of state
preemption may arise in attempting to require hospitals to recognize alternative family members
to the same extent that they currently recognize immediate family members for visitation and
treatment authorization purposes" (footnote omitted)).
144. The Rent Stabilization ordinance protects domestic partners from rent increases and evic-
tions when a lease provides for single occupancy of a residence. See Speech by Mary Tyson, City
Clerk of West Hollywood, California, given at public forum (Apr. 24, 1989); see also WEST
HOLLYWOOD, CAL., RENT STABILIZATION ORDINANCE § 6413 (1985).
145. Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
For a description of the Braschi case, see supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
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In most states, the power of a municipality to enact legislation or adopt
policies is derived from the state. In the states having cities with domestic
partnership initiatives discussed here-California, 4" Maryland, 4 7  New
York, 4 8 Washington, 49 and Wisconsin 15°--the cities derive their powers from
"home rule" provisions. A state constitutional grant of home-rule power en-
ables cities "to enact ordinances governing a wide range of local and munici-
pal affairs," free from interference by the state legislature.' 5'
Despite such home-rule provisions, cities are limited in their ability to enact
legislation. State courts have construed home-rule provisions as narrow grants
of power.'5  Typically, state courts will invalidate city ordinances that legislate
on issues deemed to be of general or statewide concern.'9 3 A state court could,
therefore, strike down an initiative as beyond municipal power if it views legal
affirmation of the relationship of unmarried cohabitators as an issue of general
statewide concern. An initiative could be struck down even in the absence of
contrary state legislation.' 4
Domestic partnership initiatives may be subject to implied preemption by
state statutes and court interpretations prohibiting same-sex marriages. Since
no state allows same-sex marriage, none of the cities having domestic partner-
ship initiatives are located in states that allow same-sex marriages. 5 While
146. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7 ("A city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police,
sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.").
147. The Maryland Constitution provides: "Any such municipal corporation, now existing or
hereinafter created, shall have the power and authority, (a) to amend or repeal an existing charter
or local laws relating to the incorporation, organization, government, or affairs of said municipal
corporation .... " MD. CONST. art. XI-E, § 3.
148. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(i) (providing that "every local government shall have power to
adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general
law relating to its property, affairs or government").
149. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 10 (1889, amended 1964, 1989) (providing any city with a popu-
lation of 10,000 or more with the power to frame a charter for its own government).
150. WIs. Co NsT. art. XI, § 3 (1848, amended 1874, 1912, 1924, 1932, 1951, 1955, 1960,
1961, 1963, 1966, 1981). This section provides: "Cities and villages organized pursuant to state
law may determine their local affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and to such
enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as with uniformity shall effect every city or
every village." Id.
151. See Note, Statutes and Ordinances, supra note 139, at 739.
152. See, e.g., Comment, One Century of Constitutional Home Rule: A Progress Report?, 64
WASH. L. REv. 155, 160 (1989) [hereinafter Comment] (reporting that Washington's courts have
limited their municipalities' broad grant of power).
153. See Feiler, Conflict Between State and Local Enactments-The Doctrine of Implied Pre-
emption, 2 URB. LAW. 398, 408-12 (1970).
154. See Note, Statutes and Ordinances, supra note 139, at 744. In many situations, municipal
ordinances which are consistent with state laws are, nevertheless, invalidated on the theory that
the state law was intended to be the sole applicable legislation. Id.
155. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974) (holding that the
Washington marriage statute does not authorize marriage between persons of the same sex); CAL.
CIv. CODE § 4100 (West 1983) (stating that marriage "arises out of a civil contract between a
man and a woman"); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-201 (1984) ("Only a marriage between a
man and a woman is valid in this state."); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.001(2) (West Supp. 1989)
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the initiatives do not purport to authorize same-sex marriages, 156 a state court
could find that determination of family status is an area of exclusive state
concern. If a state court found that health-care facility visitation is an issue of
statewide concern, then it could invalidate a West Hollywood-type initiative
that grants hospital visitation rights to partners.
1 57
In states allowing cohabitators to contract with one another, the initiatives
might withstand an implied preemption challenge. 58 A state's willingness to
respect private contracts, however, is not the same as a willingness to uphold
municipal initiatives. The initiatives are more likely to be upheld in states that
have extended benefits to gay couples under statutes providing benefits to de-
pendents or family members such as New York.
In a home-rule state, municipal legislation also remains subject to the con-
stitution and laws of the state.'59 An ordinance or municipal policy that is
viewed as conflicting with state law could be struck down on the ground that
state law preempts the ordinance.' 60 Deciding whether an ordinance conflicts
with a state statute is therefore a critical inquiry. In determining whether a
conflict exists, the "basic test ...is whether . . . a municipal ordinance per-
mits [what] a general law prohibits or vice versa.'1'6 If an ordinance permits
behavior restricted under a state law, a court could strike down the ordi-
nance.'62 A court can make this ruling even in the absence of an express
conflict.163
To the extent that domestic partnership initiatives promote, or at least toler-
ate, sexual relationships between the partners, 64 they arguably conflict with
state antisodomy laws by allowing homosexual couples to register as part-
ners.' 65 In a jurisdiction that prohibits consensual acts of sodomy, such as Ma-
("Under the laws of this state, marriage is a legal relationship between 2 equal persons, a husband
and wife, who owe to each other mutual responsibility and support."); Scheinkman, General Com-
mentary on Article 2, N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 5-8 (McKinney 1988) ("[T]he [marriage] statutes
do not authorize the issuance of marriage licenses to persons of the same gender.").
156. Boggan, supra note 103, at 13.
157. Cf Note, Statutes and Ordinances, supra note 139, at 472 (recognizing that even munici-
pal ordinances concerning matters uniquely associated with municipal government have some
state-wide effect which could subject the ordinance to preemption).
158. Cf Note, Property Rights of Same-Sex Couples, supra note 43, at 364-67 (arguing that
homosexual cohabitation contracts should be enforced in the same manner as heterosexual cohabi-
tation contracts because no logical distinction exists between the two groups).
159. See, e.g., WIs. CONST. art. X1, § 3 (for pertinent text see supra note 150).
160. See, e.g., Note, Statutes and Ordinances, supra note 139, at 741 (noting that even matters
that are "exclusively local" in character seldom prevail over conflicting state laws).
161. See Comment, supra note 152, at 169.
162. Id. at 170; see also Note, Statutes and Ordinances, supra note 139, at 744 (arguing that
only the portion of the ordinance which conflicts with a state law needs to be stricken).
163. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
164. The initiatives do not explicitly require the partners to be in a sexual relationship, but a
court could easily find that a sexual relationship is assumed. See supra text accompanying notes
110-15.
165. Cohabitation contracts could also be invalidated on this basis. See H. CURRY & D. CLIF-
FORD, supra note 23, at 2:7. The authors recommend that homosexual partners avoid using the
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ryland, 8 6 a court could decide that domestic partnership initiatives are pre-
empted by a state law. 167 Domestic partnership initiatives may also be struck
down for impermissibly condoning illegal behavior in such a jurisdiction. In
extending benefits to known violators of the law, the city may be viewed as
violating its duty to uphold and enforce state laws. 18
Sodomy statutes that could preempt domestic partnership initiatives have
survived federal constitutional challenge.1 69 Nevertheless, preemption of the
term "lovers" in contracts and instead use the word "partners" to avoid having their contracts
declared unenforceable. State statutes prohibiting fornication could also preempt domestic part-
nership initiatives. Cf Note, Property Rights of Same-Sex Couples, supra note 43, at 365 (indi-
cating that decriminalization of sodomy, adulterous cohabitation, and oral copulation between
consenting adults has promoted the recognition by courts of contract rights between homosexual
couples). See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815,
831 (1976).
166. MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. art. 27, §§ 553, 554 (1987). Maryland courts have ruled that
consensual sodomy is not exempt from prosecution under the statute. See, e.g., Gooch v. State, 34
Md. App. 331, 367 A.2d 90 (Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (stating that a violation of the statute occurred
whether the sodomy act was voluntary or involuntary).
California, Washington, and Wisconsin do not criminalize consensual sodomy by statute. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 286(c) (West Supp. 1990) (criminalizing only sodomy with a person 14 years
old or under, or sodomy against a person's will); WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.010(7) (Supp. 1989)
(defining consent to mean actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 944.01 (West Supp. 1989) (stating that "the state does not regulate the private sexual
activity of consenting adults").
New York has interpreted its sodomy statute to preclude prosecution of consensual acts. People
v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert.!denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
Contrary to popular myth, or perhaps invisibility, lesbian sexual behavior is also covered. by
many sodomy laws. See MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. art. 27 § 554 (1987) (criminalizing the acts
of a person "taking into his or her mouth the sexual organ of any other person"); see also Brief of
Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association and American Public Health Association in
Support of Respondent at 5-7, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140) (discuss-
ing cunnilingus as prohibited behavior under the Georgia sodomy statute) [hereinafter Brief of
Amicus Curiae APA].
167. Heterosexuals, of course, also engage in sodomy. See Brief of Amicus Curiae APA, supra
note 166, at 5-7.
Maryland, in fact, has applied its sodomy statute to consenting heterosexuals. See Schochet v.
State, 75 Md. App. 314, 541 A.2d 183 (Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (acquitting defendant of six charges
of forcible sexual assault and affirming conviction of participating in unnatural sex practices, or
fellatio). Nevertheless, antisodomy laws are more likely to be applied to homosexuals in light of
the Supreme Court rulings in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating statute bar-
ring use of contraceptives by unmarried individuals as violative of the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment), and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(upholding Georgia antisodomy statute as applied to homosexuals in the face of equal protection
and due process challenges).
168. Cf Note, The Concurrent State and Local Regulation of Marijuana: The Validity of the
Ann Arbor Marijuana Ordinance, 71 MICH. L. REV. 400, 417 (1972) (stating that "[t]he City of
Ann Arbor is without power to pre-empt or suspend the operation of the state law [making mari-
juana possession a felony] within her city limits").
169. E.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (holding that Georgia's sodomy stat-
ute does not violate the fourteenth amendment as applied to consenting male homosexuals).
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initiatives on the basis that they condone sodomy would reduce the entirety of
the partners' relationship to their sex acts. 7 While the importance of the
partners' sex life to their relationship cannot be denied, sex is not the only
bond in a relationship. Other values such as mutual caring and emotional inti-
macy are also prominent aspects of a relationship. 7 1 The purpose of domestic
partnership initiatives is to protect relationships, of which sex is one element.
To invalidate the initiatives because they "promote" sodomy would constitute
a narrow vision of the relationships they protect.
For similar reasons, domestic partners should not be subject to sodomy pros-
ecutions. Sodomy should not be presumed merely because a couple registers as
a domestic partnership. Moreover, states should not be allowed access to do-
mestic partnership information from cities for this purpose. Despite its other
troubling aspects, the confidentiality provision contained in most of the initia-
tives solves this problem.'72 If, for some reason, states believe that the initia-
tives promote sodomy, then the states should challenge the initiatives, or the
cities, and not the behavior of the partners. Further, the partners should not be
penalized for conduct arguably condoned by what they believe to be a valid
piece of city legislation.
A more direct form of preemption would occur if a state enacted general
legislation abolishing the ability of municipalities to act on these issues. Gen-
erally, as long as the state legislature does not pass legislation directed at a
particular city, so-called "special legislation," it is free to restrict a municipal-
ity's ability to act.173 The legislature of a state hostile towards domestic part-
nership initiatives could enact laws stripping cities of the power to extend ben-
efits to persons other than traditional family members. This possibility is more
than mere speculation. After the New York Court of Appeals' decision in
Braschi v. Stahl Associates,174 a state senator proposed an amendment to the
New York Constitution limiting the definition of "family" under New York
170. Cf. Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 755 (1989) (In discussing
Bowers v. Hardwick, Rubenfeld states that "[t]here is no reason for personhood to assert that
every sexual act is fundamental to an individual's identity. Rather the intimacy of a sexual rela-
tionship--the bond between two people-might be what is central." (emphasis in original)).
171. Many of the initiatives emphasize the long-term commitments of the partners as well as
the "emotional and psychological bonds" fostered by recognizing domestic partners. SEATTLE,
WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE 114648, preamble (Aug. 18, 1989).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
173. See MD. CONST. art. XI-E, § I ("The General Assembly shall act in relation to the incor-
poration, organization, government or affairs of any such municipal corporation only by general
laws which shall in their terms and in their effect apply alike to all municipal corporations.");
N.Y. CoNsT. art. XI, § 2(b)(2) ("The legislature [sihall have the power to act in relation to the
property, affairs of government of any local government only by general law."); WASH. CONST. art.
11, § 10 (1889, amended 1964) ("[A]II charters ... adopted by authority of this Constitution
shall be subject to and controlled by general laws."). For California's constitutional provision, see
supra note 146. For Wisconsin's constitutional provision, see supra note 150.
174. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989). For a description of the Bras-
chi case, see supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
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state law to traditional family members. 7
2. Federal Preemption
Domestic partnership initiatives may also be partially preempted by federal
law. One possible source of preemption is the federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"). 176 ERISA regulates employee benefit plans.
ERISA specifically states that its provisions "shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described" in the statute, unless exempt from its provisions. 177 Under this pro-
vision, most state regulation of employee benefit plans is preempted by
ERISA. 1' The only exemptions from federal preemption of local laws under
ERISA are state laws that regulate "insurance, banking or securities. ' 179
A unanimous Supreme Court, in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,' 80 interpreted
the language of ERISA's preemption provision very broadly. In Shaw, Delta
challenged the application of New York's Human Rights Law,' and Disabil-
ity Benefits Law 8 2 to company benefit plans subject to ERISA. 83 Delta's ben-
efit plans did not provide benefits to pregnant women.' 8 4 The two New York
175. O'Malley, Lawmaker Wants to Exclude Gays in Definition of Family, U.P.I. (Dec. 13,
1989).
176. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1988). Section 1001 provides that ERISA is intended to protect the interests of participants in
employee benefit plans through disclosure and reporting requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(1988).
ERISA covers "any employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained-(1) by any em-
ployer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (2) by any
employee organization or organizations representing employees engaged in commerce or in any
industry or activity affecting commerce; or (3) by both." 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1988). Certain
church organizations and governmental entities are not subject to ERISA. Id. § 1003(b). Benefit
plans include pension benefit plans and welfare benefit plans. Id. § 1002(1)-(2). Welfare benefit
plans are programs that provide for their participants "through the purchase of insurance or oth-
erwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training
programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services." Id. § 1002(1).
177. Id. § 1144(a) (1988).
178. "The term 'State' includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any agency or
instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and condi-
tions of employee benefit plans covered by this subchapter." Id. § 1144(c)(2).
"The term 'State law' includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action hav-
ing the effect of law, of any State. ... Id. § 1144(c)(1).
179. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). "Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking or securities." Id.
180. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
181. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1982-1983), cited in Shaw, 463
U.S. at 88.
182. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW §§ 200-242 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1982-1983), cited in
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 89.
183. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 92.
184. Id.
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statutes required the extension of such benefits but federal law did not.188 The
Court concluded that the two state statutes fell within ERISA's preemptive
reach because they "relate to" employee benefit plans. 8 The Court stated
that ERISA preemption did not merely preempt "state laws specifically
designed to affect employee benefit plans. 187 As applied to benefit plans, stat-
utes that prohibit discriminatory practices not specifically prohibited by fed-
eral law are preempted by ERISA.' 88
The expansive interpretation of ERISA adopted by the Supreme Court in
Shaw has implications for domestic partnership initiatives. A city or state re-
quirement that private employers provide benefits to the domestic partners of
their employees "relate[s] to" an employee benefit plan and is arguably pre-
empted by ERISA. 89 This is possible even if the initiative does not mention
employee benefit plans on its face.'"
ERISA has already been interpreted as preempting the application of mu-
nicipal legislation prohibiting discrimination against cohabitants for benefits
subject to ERISA. The Seattle Fair Employment Practices Ordinance prohib-
its discrimination against cohabitants.911 In May, 1989, the Seattle Human
Rights Department ruled that the ordinance required private employers in the
city to provide medical and health benefits to the partners of unmarried em-
ployees equivalent to that provided to the spouses of married employees.'
Due to preemption, Seattle's City Attorney concluded that the ruling does not
185. Id. at 89. "ERISA does not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits, and
does not itself proscribe discrimination in the provision of employee benefits." Id. at 91. "
Discrimination in the provision of benefit plans is prohibited to the extent that such discrimina-
tion is prohibited by substantive federal law, other than ERISA. ERISA provides that "[n]othing
in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law of the United States." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), is applicable to benefit plans covered by
ERISA. Thus, employers can not discriminate in providing benefits if their practices violate Title
VII.
Federal law now requires employers to provide benefits to pregnant women under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
186. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (citing the language of 29 U.S.C. §
514(a) (1985)). The Court noted that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan ... if it has a
connection with or reference to such a plan." Id. (footnote omitted).
187. Id. at 98.
188. Id. at 108.
189. Cf Law & Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians' Fees: Individual Patients or Society? (A
Case Study in Federalism), 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 78 (1986) (arguing that ERISA "imposes sig-
nificant limits on states that seek to develop social responses to major problems in medical insur-
ance cost, coverage, and accessibility").
190. See Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An
Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1313, 1334 (1984) (giving examples of decided
cases, including Shaw, where ERISA preempted state laws that were ambiguously related to em-
ployee benefits).
191. The ordinance covers companies with four or more employees. Many Companies Would
Be Exempt From Live-in Insurance Coverage, U.P.I. (May 11, 1989).
192. Id.
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apply to an employer whose benefit plans are covered by ERISA.' 9 Since
most Seattle employers' benefits plans are covered by ERISA, the impact of
the ordinance and the Department's ruling on private employers' benefit plans
is virtually nonexistent.
Due to possible ERISA preemption, a city can only require that private
employers provide benefits to the domestic partners of employees if mandated
by federal law, or by passing a law regulating insurance."' Under the applica-
ble federal law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers are not
required to provide benefits to the domestic partners of their employees. 195 Un-
til Title VII provisions are changed, it is unlikely that domestic partnership
initiatives can be applied to private employers. Additionally, ordinances
prohibiting discrimination against domestic partners in employment are not
likely to qualify as state regulation of insurance, exempt from ERISA preemp-
tion. 96 Thus, ERISA may effectively prohibit cities from requiring private
employers to provide benefits for the partners of their employees. Outside the
parameters of ERISA, however, the municipalities can continue to prohibit
discrimination against domestic partners.
3. Avoiding Preemption
Preemption problems limit the ability of municipalities to force third parties
to recognize and treat domestic partnerships equitably. Indeed, the limited
scope of domestic partnership initiatives indicates that municipalities have
structured their initiatives to avoid preemption problems. Most of the initia-
tives only cover municipal employees, and therefore avoid ERISA preemption.
Further, most initiatives are adopted through private or collective bargaining
agreements and not pursuant to an ordinance. 197 By failing to implicate third
parties and by enacting domestic partnership agreements through collective
bargaining, the initiatives may be insulated from legal challenge. If protection
193. See supra note 176 (describing plans covered by ERISA).
194. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
195. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). This section provides that it is an unlawful employ-
ment practice to "discriminate against any individual ... because of... race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." Id. Section 2001e-(k) defines "because of sex" to include "because of or on
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 29 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k). Two
provisions indicate that Title VII applies to employees only and not to family members, and that
Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual preference.
196. Cf Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (holding that a Massa-
chusetts law requiring health insurance policies to include mental health benefits was not pre-
empted by ERISA because the law related to insurance and not to employee benefit plans); Note,
Defining the Contours of ERISA Preemption of State Insurance Regulation: Making Employee
Benefit Plan Regulation an Exclusively Federal Concern, 42 VAND. L. REV. 607, 628 (1989)
(arguing that the insurance, banking, and securities savings clause found in 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(2)(A) has been narrowed to "preserve only state-mandated benefit laws and, presumably,
any state statute specifically regulating the terms of an insurance contract" from ERISA preemp-
tion (footnote omitted)).
197. See Law & Ensminger, supra note 189, at 76 (noting that "Congress has placed plans
outside the realm of legal regulation and social control, except for collective bargaining").
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is limited to what is available through private agreements, however, the bene-
fits partners can receive are commensurately limited. While cities have ini-
tially succeeded in providing partners with a limited range of entitlements,
preemption challenges might discourage cities from expanding the types of
benefits available.
Preemption is not only a litigation concern. The adoption of a domestic part-
nership initiative by a city is an explicit recognition that the city is powerless
to change the fact that homosexual partners are denied certain entitlements
such as federal tax benefits or marriage. As Berkeley's City Manager stated:
"The State's narrow definition of marriage is beyond the power of the City of
Berkeley or its citizens to change. Efforts aimed at the state level are politi-
cally useless at this time, either in changing the definition of marriage or the
pattern of use in California."' 9
4. Federal Marital Status Classifications
While not an issue of preemption, receipt of benefits under domestic part-
nership initiatives may create difficulties for the partners under federal laws
that apply marital status classifications. 99 Such laws include the Bankruptcy
Code,"' the Social Security Act,2 0' and the Internal Revenue Code.2 °0
The extension of health benefits to the domestic partners of employees may
be problematic, for example, under the Internal Revenue Code. The cost of
medical benefits provided to a domestic partner may be taxable to the em-
ployee, even though such benefits are not taxable when provided to a spouse. 0
The Internal Revenue Service "does not recognize unmarried partners in
health-insurance plans and may insist that ... employees pay taxes on health
benefits if those benefits were extended to unmarried couples.12 0 4 The partners
may also be disadvantaged if the federal government considers one partner's
income in calculating the other partner's eligibility for need-based
198. Boggan, supra note 103, at 13; see also Salholz, The Future of Gay America, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 12, 1990, at 20, 25 (concluding that it is unlikely that gay marriage will be recognized in the
foreseeable future due to objections by church and state officials).
199. See Reppy, Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal for Cre-
ating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REv. 1677, 1694-1705 (1984) (discussing interaction of
cohabitant contracts with federal laws using marital status classifications).
200. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(1) (1988) (including spouse in the definition of "dependent"
who qualifies for exemptions from the estate of a debtor).
201. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (1988) (defining family status as wife, husband, widower,
widow, or good faith participant in a marriage ceremony, for purposes of receiving Social Security
benefits).
202. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 105(b) (1988) (exempting from taxation medical benefits received
by an employee on behalf of the employee's spouse or dependents).
203. Id. The tax exemption is available to a taxpayer only when the benefit is paid directly to
the taxpayer's spouse or dependents.
204. Gudridge, Seattle Suspends Live-In Health Benefit Rule, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, June 5,
1989, at 5 (Life & Health/Financial Services ed.) (summarizing comments of Seattle city attor-
ney Doug Jewett).
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programs.210
The value of the benefits associated with domestic partnership initiatives
probably will outweigh the negative consequences which might accompany
them, making the benefits worthwhile to the partners. According to opponents
of domestic partnership initiatives, however, being subjected to such disadvan-
tages is what marital obligation is all about.2"6 The balance struck between
receiving benefits under one program and being burdened by another demon-
strates the complexity of the entitlement structure that domestic partnership
initiatives may affect. Nevertheless, many of the benefits available under the
initiatives will not implicate the marital status classifications in federal laws.
D. Should Domestic Partnership Initiatives Use Marriage As A Model?
In addition to practical considerations, domestic partnership initiatives give
rise to a theoretical dilemma. As they are currently drafted, domestic partner-
ship initiatives seem to require partners to have a marital-type relationship. 07
This requirement reflects an underlying tension as to whether the domestic
partnership initiatives are a first step in the direction of allowing gay marriage
or whether the initiatives are an attempt to promote an alternative vision of
the family. Regardless of the answer, the purposes of domestic partnership
initiatives and what they promote should be clarified.
1. How Current Initiatives Imitate Marriage
While domestic partnership initiatives do not purport to allow same-sex
marriages, many of their requirements mirror marital requirements. All the
domestic partnership initiatives discussed here require the partners to be in a
monogamous relationship.2 0 8 As is generally the case in marriage, the partners
205. See M. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE, 282 (1989); see also Gorney, Making It Official:
The Law & Live-Ins; San Francisco Recognizes the Domestic Partner, Wash. Post, July 5, 1989,
at Cl, col. 1. In the Gorney article, a gay opponent of domestic partnership initiatives expressed
his fear that AIDS treatment cost reimbursement for domestic partners might depend upon the
total income of the partners rather than on the income of only the afflicted partner. Id. at C9, col.
4. This problem, however, would probably arise only if domestic partners were recognized as hav-
ing financial obligations toward one another. Regarding the likelihood that domestic partnership
initiatives will be interpreted as creating financial obligations between partners, see supra notes
132-33 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., Sherman, Gay Couples Seek Recognition; New York Ruling Raises Hopes,
NAT'L L.J., July 31, 1989, at 3 (raising the possibility that the surviving member of a gay couple
could be responsible for his or her companion's medical bills).
207. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership (1986) (requiring that domes-
tic partners swear that (1) they reside together and have done so for 6 months; (2) that they are
not married; (3) that they are not related by blood; and (4) that they are each others sole domes-
tic partner). See infra Appendix B for an example of an Affidavit of Domestic Partnership.
208. See, e.g., WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 22 § I(A) (Feb. 26, 1985). The
ordinance defines a domestic partnership as "exist[ing] between two persons if ... (6) [t]he
persons declare that they are each other's sole domestic partner; . . . [and] (9) [n]either person
has declared that he or she has a different domestic partner." Id.
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must be eighteen years of age,2"' and must also be competent to sign and
enforce contracts.2 10 The partners must not be blood relatives, 211 and cannot
already be married.212 In most cities, each of the partners must wait six
months after terminating a domestic partnership before registering as a mem-
ber of a different partnership.213 This period is analogous to the waiting period
between obtaining a final divorce and being eligible to marry again. 214
In some respects, the requirements for domestic partnerships are more oner-
ous than those for marriage.21 ' Many cities require domestic partners to have
been together as a couple, or to have actually lived together for several
months, before registering as partners.21 New York City requires partners to
live together for a year before qualifying for domestic partnership benefits.
2 1 7
In contrast, married couples are eligible to receive benefits as soon as they are
married, without having lived together beforehand.2 18 Domestic partners are
required to live together.219 Married couples are not subject to this
209. Compare id. § 1(A)(4)-(5) (requiring domestic partners to be 18 years of age and compe-
tent to contract) with CAL. CIv. CODE § 4101(a) (1990) (requiring that "any unmarried person
over the age 18 years and upwards is capable of consenting to and consummating marriage").
210. Compare WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., ORDINANCE 22 § I(A)(5) (Feb. 26, 1985) (requiring
that partners be competent to contract) with CAL. Civ. CODE § 4425 (1990) (indicating that lack
of capacity of a party entering a marriage is grounds for an annulment).
211. WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., ORDINANCE 22 § I(A)(1) (Feb. 26, 1985). This is a consan-
guinity requirement. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing consanguinity
requirements).
212. WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., ORDINANCE 22 § I(A)(2) (Feb. 26, 1985).
213. See, e.g., Santa Cruz, Cal., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership (1990) (the employee "un-
derstand[s] that another Affidavit of Domestic Partnership cannot be filed until six (6) months
after a statement of termination of the previous partnership has been filed with [the] Personnel
Department").
214. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4514(a) (West. Supp. 1990) (noting with respect to a final
divorce judgment, "no judgment entered ... shall be final until six months have expired from the
date of service of a copy of summons and petition or the date of appearance of the respondent,
whichever occurs first"); see also Boggan, supra note 103, at 18 (disclosing that the six-month
waiting period between domestic partnership filings is equal to the time required to obtain a
divorce).
215. See Sullivan, supra note 107, at 22. Domestic partnership agreements usually require "an
elaborate statement of intent to qualify." Id.
216. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership (1986) ("[We] affirm ... that
this domestic partnership has been in existence for a period of six (6) consecutive months, at least,
prior to the date identified on this affidavit."). But see TAKOMA PARK, MD., HOUSING CODE § 6-
81(a) (1986) (allowing partners who have lived together for less than a year to register for bene-
fits if they "can show other indicia of a committed relationship").
217. See, e.g., New York, N.Y., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership for Bereavement Leave
(1989). By signing the affidavit, the partners swear that they "are currently living together and
have been living together for a period of one year or more on a continuous basis." Id.
218. E.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1990) (providing that at least
a portion of a decedent's estate will pass to a spouse if the decedent died without a will, regardless
of the length of time married).
219. See New York, N.Y., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership for Bereavement Leave (1989).
West Hollywood's ordinance provides that "[t]he domestic partnership statement shall include the
date on which the persons became each other's domestic partners and the address or addresses of
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requirement. 2 0
To an extent, some of the stringent requirements that apply to domestic
partners reflect understandable governmental goals. Requiring the partners to
live together may, in fact, decrease fraudulent claims. The City Manager of
Berkeley realizes that the living-together requirement may be "theoretically
. ..unfair to same-gender couples," but he thought it was "practically...
fair and necessary" as an indication of the seriousness of the relationship. 21
Without such a requirement, he feared "abuse of the opportunity" to register
as domestic partners. 2 Requiring the partners to be eighteen years of age or
able to understand contracts may also relate to acceptable goals. The cities
have an interest in making sure that the partners understand the implications
of the affidavit and are legally able to sign it.
Other requirements of the domestic partnership initiatives, however, indi-
cate that the initiatives assume that the relationship between domestic part-
ners is virtually identical to the relationship between married couples. A con-
sanguinity requirement, for example, has no purpose without assuming that
the partners have a marriage-like relationship.2 2 8 Forcing partners to be in a
monogamous relationship also assumes that the partners have a marriage-like
relationship. Likewise, a prohibition against a married person becoming a do-
mestic partner assumes the relationship is marital.224 It is analogous to a pro-
hibition against bigamy.
In-many cases, the initiatives are in fact a self-conscious "attempt to try to
equalize . . . benefits between married couples and couples who are not mar-
ried, either through choice or because they are barred from marriage, as in the
case of lesbian or gay male couples. 226 In recommending an extension of ben-
efits to domestic partners, the City Manager of Berkeley proclaimed,
"Whatever one may think of extending benefits to different kinds of relation-
ships, it has no immediate bearing on the issue of extending benefits to similar
relationships. '12  Thus, the initiatives appear to benefit only those partnerships
that successfully imitate the traditional marriage model.
both partners." WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 22, § 2(A) (Feb. 26, 1985). This lan-
guage is ambiguous and has at least two plausible interpretations. Either the partners must live
together but they may have more than one common residence, or the partners may maintain
separate residences. In view of the other requirements of partnership, such as being each other's
sole domestic partner, the former is the more plausible interpretation.
220. See 41 AM. JUR. 2D, Husband and Wife § 7, at 24 (1968) (stating that the "term 'living
together', as applied to husband and wife, does not always mean a common place of living").
221. Boggan, supra note 103, at 17.
222. Id.
223. See text accompanying notes 110-13 (discussing domestic partnership initiative consan-
guinity requirements).
224. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE 114648 § 4.30.020(A)(2)(b) (1989). The affidavit
of domestic partnership must contain a provision affirming that the partners are not married. Id.
225. Berkeley, Cal., Domestic Partnership Information Sheet (1987).
226. Boggan, supra note 103, at 11.
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2. The Theoretical Debate
Supporters of the initiatives disagree over whether they are a step toward
same-sex marriages or whether same sex marriage should even exist. In a pub-
lished debate with Thomas Stoddard in Out/Look magazine, Paula Ettelbrick
of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, posed the question, Since
When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?
2'7
While Ettelbrick understands gay men and lesbians' desire to have their
status changed from "outsiders" to "insiders" through marriage, she opposes
gay marriage on two grounds.2 8 First, she fears that gay marriage will "force
[homosexual] assimilation into the mainstream, and undermine the goals of
gay liberation.1 229 She does not want to give the state the power to regulate
her "primary relationship. 22 0 Second, she argues that gay marriage will per-
petuate the "narrow, but dramatic, distinctions [our society makes] between
those who are married and those who are not married. '2 1 In sanctioning gay
marriage, society will therefore fail to "respect[] and encourage[] choice of
relationships and diversity. 232
Ettelbrick supports domestic partnership initiatives precisely because she
views them as protecting alternative families and because they lay the
"groundwork for revolutionizing society's views of the family. ' '23 She does not
interpret domestic partnership initiatives as requiring the partners to be in a
sexual or romantic relationship.23' Thus, for Ettelbrick, domestic partnership
initiatives are progressive validations of nonmarital relationships.22 5
Thomas Stoddard, also of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, de-
bated Ettelbrick. He discussed the issue: Why Gay People Should Seek the
Right to Marry.2 16 Stoddard views domestic partnership initiatives as a step
227. Ettelbrick & Stoddard, supra note 48, at 9.
228. Id. at 9, 14.
229. Id. at 14. Almost two decades ago Ralph Hall espoused views similar to Ettelbrick's:
Homosexual marriages submitting to the guidelines of so-called conventional rites
must be classed as reactionary. The gay lib movement does not need these kinds of
tactics. We're involved in rational warfare, not irrational. Now, don't you agree it
isn't relevant to gay liberation when we start imitating meaningless, bad habits of our
oppressors and begin instituting them? That isn't the freedom we want. That isn't our
liberation. That isn't the equality we want. And that ain't revolutionary.
Hall, The Church, State & Homosexuality: A Radical Analysis, 14 Gay Power (quoted in D.
TEAL, THE GAY MILITANTS 291 (1971)) (emphasis in original).
230. Ettelbrick & Stoddard, supra note 48, at 14.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 17.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 9. Stoddard is not alone in his advocacy of homosexual marriage. Legal scholarship
abounds with support for homosexual marriage. See, e.g., Friedman, The Necessity for State Rec-
ognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family, 3
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 134 (1988); Lewis, From This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Dis-
course on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE L.J. 1783 (1988); Note, Marriage: Homosexual
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towards equality, where homosexual couples have the same right as heterosex-
ual couples to marry.237 While Stoddard recognizes that "marriage has been
oppressive, especially ...for women," he nevertheless believes "that the gay
rights movement should aggressively seek full legal recognition for same-sex
marriages. ' 23 8 Stoddard believes that every solution to confer benefits on gay
and lesbian couples other than marriage "will inevitably, under current cir-
cumstances, be incomplete" 239 and will maintain homosexual relationships in
their "subsidiary status." '24 He also argues that there are "some barriers one
simply cannot transcend outside of a formal marriage," such as eligibility for
favorable tax or immigration status under federal law. 2 1
Stoddard emphasizes that he is not discussing the "desirability of marriage,
but rather the desirability of the right to marry. 2 4 2 Stoddard claims that al-
lowing homosexual marriage would change the institution of marriage, making
it less oppressive and static. 4 3 Finally, he views allowing gays and lesbians to
marry as a litmus test of society's commitment to end discrimination against
gays and lesbians.2
4 4
While Ettelbrick and Stoddard are articulate advocates of their opinions,
both seem to dismiss crucial aspects of the realities many couples and alterna-
tive families face. In his desire to obtain entitlements, Stoddard discounts the
impact of marriage as a social institution. Since marriage is statutorily de-
fined, couples are limited in the ways in which they may structure their rela-
tionship. Indeed, the failure of many heterosexual couples to marry when mar-
riage is an option for them indicates the confining structure of marriage.
Stoddard also downplays the notion that marriage is "the bedrock of a heter-
osexually dominated society" 4 5 and the difficulty gays will face in changing
the institution of marriage. Thus, in advocating that homosexual couples adopt
roles similar to married couples, Stoddard's solution seems to perpetuate mar-
riage as society's sole method of legalizing intimate relationships.
In her advocacy of liberation from marital bonds, Ettelbrick dismisses the
expressed desire of many homosexual couples to marry. Many homosexual
Couples Need Not Apply, 23 NEw ENG. L. REV. 515 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Homosexual
Couples Need Not Apply]; Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573
(1973). The American Civil Liberties Union also advocates homosexual marriage. See Note, Ho-
mosexual Couples Need Not Apply, supra, at 515-16 n.3.
Even some conservatives support homosexual marriage. In The New Republic, Andrew Sullivan
argued that the state should allow gay marriage because "[]ike straight marriage, it would foster
social cohesion, emotional security, and economic prudence." Sullivan, supra note 107, at 22.
237. Ettelbrick & Stoddard, supra note 48, at 12-13.
238. Id. at 10.
239. Id. at 11.
240. Id. at 13.
241. Id. at 12.
242. Id. at 13.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 12.
245. LESBIAN RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 51, at 12.
1991]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
couples have litigated to obtain the right to marry. 46 While some advocates
may view lobbying for gay marriage merely as an alternative to the current
reality,24" 7 not all gays and lesbians share that sentiment. That is, many homo-
sexual couples want to get married solely for social and psychological, as op-
posed to legal reasons.248 Moreover, many homosexual couples' relationships
are virtually indistinguishable from those of married couples. ' 9 To claim that
they must be different as a matter of principle seems to ignore the preferences
of many homosexual couples.
While Ettelbrick's fear of having the state regulate her "primary relation-
ship" through marriage is understandable, her argument overlooks the fact
that the state already regulates such relationships even in the absence of ex-
press regulation. The state regulates a gay couple's relationship every time it
denies one partner access to the other in the hospital, or fails to let a partner
make medical decisions. Traditional family members are entitled to make
these decisions without question 80
3. The Initiatives as a Compromise
The tension expressed by Ettelbrick and Stoddard's debate is reflected in the
domestic partnership initiatives themselves. The initiatives extend benefits to
unmarried homosexual and heterosexual couples and therefore recognize non-
traditional relationships. Nevertheless, the initiatives seem to provide benefits
only to those couples whose relationships successfully imitate that of married
couples. In this respect, domestic partnership initiatives seem to be a form of
local marriage, rather than a social affirmation of an alternative'type of fam-
ily. Domestic partnership initiatives are a local compromise resting somewhere
between Ettelbrick's view that the initiatives recognize alternative families and
Stoddard's view they are a step in the direction of sanctioning gay marriages.
This compromise is a troubling one. 5' Domestic partnership initiatives
246. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971) (seeking writ of man-
damus to compel city clerk to issue a marriage license to two adult males), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 810 (1972).
247. Cf. Ettelbrick & Stoddard, supra note 48, at 8; 12-13 (urging gays to seek the right to
marry or the abolishment of marriage).
248. The psychological benefit of marriage is evidenced by the occurrence of gay and lesbian
marriages which are not recognized by the state as legal marriages. See id. at 8 (reporting "the
popularity of 'The Wedding,' . . . the event at the 1987 March on Washington for Lesbian and
Gay Rights at which thousands of men and women 'married' their partners of the same sex").
249. See LESBIAN RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 51, at II (arguing that the elements of success-
ful lesbian and gay relationships are "virtually identical" to the elements of successful comparable
heterosexual relationships).
250. For a discussion of the Kowalski case in which a family member, who was given custody
of an incapacitated woman, denied the woman's partner visitation rights, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 26-28.
251. Even some proponents of the initiatives recognize their incoherence. In fact, they applaud
this confusion, claiming that it will force states to allow homosexual marriage. See Gorney, supra
note 91 (reporting that Cynthia Goldstein, a National Gay Rights Advocates staff attorney,
stated, "And I hope what [domestic partnership] show[s] is that it's too confusing to have this
450 [Vol. 40:417
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should not be a hybrid means of both recognizing gay marriage and protecting
cohabiting family members. Rather, they should attempt to promote and pro-
tect only one vision or both visions. Otherwise, neither vision will be ade-
quately protected. Moreover, the initiatives serve as models for other cities
considering domestic partnerships252 and may serve as models for state legisla-
tures. Thus, there is a need for cities to articulate their purposes clearly.
If the initiatives are going to burden relationships with heightened marital-
type requirements in order for partners to qualify, then the initiatives should
provide more protection to the couples. Even at the city level, more protection
is available than the cities currently extend.2"' If the cities are willing to pro-
vide only limited protection, then the cities should have fewer domestic part-
nership requirements. Cities could require the affidavits, for example, but
could eliminate the six-month waiting period and the monogamy requirement.
To the extent that cities fear that elimination of these requirements will-in-
crease fraud,254 perhaps the cities can develop other criteria to prevent
fraud.255
While there is no reason that the legal system cannot simultaneously protect
both cohabitators and married people, domestic partnership initiatives should
focus on promoting only a single vision at the present time. Considering that
the initiatives currently only seem viable at the city level, cities should strive to
protect alternative family arrangements rather than promoting marriage. Mar-
riage is a distinct and separate goal. Merely creating a local marriage does not
change the entitlement structure. In fact, as Ettelbrick stated, creating a mari-
tal-type relationship means that only people who are exclusive couples are re-
warded for being responsible family members. 56
4. Domestic Partnerships as an Alternative Vision of the Family
Domestic partnership initiatives should promote alternative visions of the
family. Protecting alternative family status means that couples who either do
not wish to marry, or are unable to marry, will receive similar protections to
new category of relationship, and wouldn't it be more logical just to let gay and lesbian couples
get married?").
The logical connection, however, is tenuous. If the initiatives are difficult to administer or are
unclear about the purposes they foster, then the more likely result will be their repeal. Addition-
ally, such a cavalier attitude seems to ignore the fact that people need the protections provided by
the initiatives, rather than a theoretical debate waged at their expense.
252. See, e.g., Frisco on the Potomac, Wash. Times, July 11, 1989, at F2 (reporting that the
District of Columbia was studying the San Francisco Ordinance in contemplation of adopting a
domestic partnership initiative). Indeed, the District of Columbia has "recently passed a family
leave act which includes lesbians and gay partners in its definition of family members." NATIONAL
CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS NEWSLETTER, Fall/Winter 1990, at 10.
253. See text accompanying note 139.
254. See Boggan, supra note 103, at 19.
255. Alternatives such as personally interviewing domestic partners might be more closely re-
lated to preventing fraud.
256. Ettelbrick & Stoddard, supra note 48, at 9.
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those afforded married partners. Perhaps more importantly, as domestic part-
nership initiatives become more widespread, people who love each other and
build a strong family without being a "couple" will be rewarded for that be-
havior. Cities trying to adopt innovative family policies do not need to rein-
force society's fixation on couples. People who never find, or do not search for,
the one person with whom to share their lives, or elderly people without tradi-
tional family members to surround them, will have their relationships valued
by a governmental entity. Certainly, mutual caring, respect, and long-term
commitment among two or more people not necessarily related by blood or
marriage should be fostered both locally and nationally.
Alternative visions of the family should not be any more difficult to promote
at the city level than domestic partnership initiatives currently are. If the po-
litical clout exists at the local level for domestic partnership initiatives, then
allowing a wider range of relationships to qualify should not be that much
harder to achieve.2 57
IV. CONCLUSION
Domestic partnership initiatives are a positive step towards legally sanction-
ing the relationships of gay men and lesbians. The vulnerability of city-based
initiatives, however, indicates that state level initiatives are needed in order to
provide equitable treatment under the law to homosexual couples. Neverthe-
less, the city initiatives are valuable because they do provide some protection
to gay and lesbian couples. Moreover, the initiatives provide a model for solu-
tions that can be enacted at the state level. Legislators can learn from the
initiatives and discover the type of solutions that will work and the type that
will not work.
In their current form, domestic partnership initiatives appear to be a type of
gay marriage at the local level. While recognition of homosexual marriage
may be one solution to the inequitable treatment of gay and lesbian couples, it
is not a satisfactory solution for all homosexual couples. Marriage is certainly
not a satisfactory solution for many heterosexual couples either. Thus, advo-
cates should lobby for both gay marriage and for the protection of nontradi-
tional families.
Even with their limitations, until state legislatures and courts are receptive
257. A city's provision of benefits to alternative families will not detract from the benefits cur-
rently available to married couples and traditional families. See Crutchfield, Nonmarital Rela-
tionships and Their Impact on the Institution of Marriage and the Traditional Family Structure,
19 J. FAM. L. 247 (1981) (arguing that recognition of unmarried cohabitators will not erode the
institution of marriage). Married couples and traditional families will still receive their state and
federal entitlements.
While rethinking whether marriages should receive all of their current privileges is a topic
worth pursuing, domestic partnership initiatives at the city level do not really implicate marital
entitlements. As domestic partnership legislation is considered at the state and federal level, the
questionable primacy of marriage will have to be discussed explicitly, instead of implicitly, by its
proponents.
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to recognizing a variety of family relationships, domestic partnership initia-
tives are a necessary and welcome recognition of non-traditional couples.
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Appendix A
An Ordinance of the City of West Hollywood Establishing Regulations
Governing the Creation, Termination and Effect of Domestic Partnerships
THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF WEST HOLLYWOOD DOES ORDAIN As
FOLLOWS:
Section 1. Definition of Domestic Partnership
A. A domestic partnership shall exist between two persons if the following
is true:
(1) The persons are not related by blood closer than would bar marriage in
the State of California;
(2) Neither person is married or related by marriage;
(3) The persons share the common necessities of life;
(4) The persons are eighteen (18) years old or older;
(5) The persos are competent to enter a contract;
(6) The persos declare that they are each other's sole domestic partner;
(7) The persons are responsible for each other's welfare;
(8) The persons agree to notify the City of any change in the status of
their domestic partnership;
(9) Neither person has declared that he or she has a different domestic
partner;
(10) The persons file a statement of domestic partnership as set forth in
Section 2 of this ordinance.
Section 2. Statement of Domestic Partnership
A. Contents
Domestic partners may make an official record of their domestic partnership
by completing, signing and submitting to the City Clerk a statement of domes-
tic partnership. Persons submitting a statement of domestic partnership must
declare under penalty of perjury:
(1) The persons are not related by blood closer than would bar marriage in
the State of California:
(2) Neither person is married or related by marriage;
(3) , The persons share the common necessities of life;
(4) The persons are eighteen (18) years old or older;
(5) The persons are competent to enter a contract;
(6) The persons declare that they are each other's sole domestic partner;
(7) The persons agree to be responsible for each other's welfare;
(8) The persons agree to notify the City of any change in the status of
their domestic partnership;
(9) Neither person has declared that he or she has a different domestic
partner.
The domestic partnership statement shall include the date on which the per-
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sons became each other's domestic partners and the address or addresses of
both partners.
B. Amendment of Domestic Partnership Statement
Partners may amend the statement at any time in order to change an ad-
dress, by filing a new statement.
C. Termination of Domestic Partnership
Any member of a domestic partnership may terminate the domestic partner-
ship by filing a termination statement with the City Clerk. The person filing
the termination statement must declare under penalty of perjury: (1) The do-
mestic partnership is terminated and (2) A copy of the termination statement
has been mailed to the other domestic partner.
D. New Statement of Domestic Partnership
No person who has filed an affidavit of domestic partnership may file an-
other statement of domestic partnership until six (6) months after a statement
of termination of a previous partnership has been filed with the City Clerk.
Section 3 A. Filing of Statements
Anyone who signs a statement of domestic partnership may file it with the
City Clerk. A domestic partnership statement, termination statement or
amendment of domestic partnership statement shall not be deemed effective
unless filed with the City Clerk and in accordance with the provisions of this
Chapter.
B. Form of Statements
All statements relating to domestic partnerships shall be executed as a dec-
laration made under penalty of perjury. The City Clerk shall provide forms as
necessary to interested individuals. A statement prepared in substantially the
same form as that provided in Section 4227 shall be sufficient for the purpose
of this Chapter.
C. Fees for Statements
(1) The City Clerk shall charge a fee for filing a domestic partnership
statement, a termination of domestic partnership statement, and for filing an
amendment to a domestic partnership statement. The amount of this fee
shall be determined by resolution of the City Council.
(2) Payment of the above fee entitles the person filing the statement on
behalf of the domestic partnership to have two copies of the statement certi-
fied by the City Clerk.
Certification of additional copies at the time of filing shall cost an amount
per copy to be determined by resolution of the City Council. Certification of
the additional copies at any other time shall cost an amount per copy to be
determined by resolution of the City Council.
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Section 4 City Clerk's Records
The City Clerk shall maintain adequate records of domestic partnership
statements showing which domestic partnerships have been created, termi-
nated or amended.
Section 5 Civil Actions
Any person defrauded by a false statement contained in a statement of do-
mestic partnership, termination statement or amendment statement may bring
a civil action for fraud to recover his or her losses.
Section 6 Limited Effect
This Chapter does not make the California Uniform Partnership Act (Corp
C 15001 et seq.) applicable to domestic partnerships.
Section 7 Visitation Rights
All health care facilities including but not limited to hospitals, convalescent
facilities or other long-term health care facilities shall allow a domestic part-
ner of a patient to visit the patient unless no visitors are allowed.
Section 8 Jail Visitation
All City jails shall allow an inmate's domestic partner to visit the inmate
unless:
(1) No visitors are allowed, or
(2) The authority in charge of the jail decides that the particular visitor is
a threat to the security of the facility.
Section 9 Forms
The following forms shall be sufficient proof of the creation or termination
of [a] domestic partnership:
A. STATEMENT OF DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP
We, the undersigned, do declare that:
(1) We are not related by blood;
(2) Neither of us is married, nor are we related by marriage;
(3) We share the common necessities of life;
(4) We are each other's domestic partner, and we have been each other's
domestic partner since
(5) We are the sole domestic partner of each other and have no other do-
mestic partners.
(6) We are both over 18 years of age;
(7) We are responsible for each other's welfare;
(8) We agree to notify the City of any change in the status of our domes-
tic partnership arrangement;
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Califor-
nia that the statements made above are true and correct.
Executed on , 19-, at , California.
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVES
Signed:
Print:
Address:
Telephone Number:
Signed:
Print:
Address:
Telephone Number:
B. STATEMENT TERMINATING DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP
I, the undersigned, do declare that:
1. (Name of Individual as shown on domestic partnership statement) and I
are no longer domestic partners; and,
2. I mailed my former domestic partner a copy of this notice at
on ., 19
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California
that the statements above are true and correct.
Executed on ,19 ,at ,
California.
Signed:
Print:
Address:
Telephone Number:
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Appendix B
City of Berkeley Affidavit of Domestic Partnership
I, (Name of Employee), certify that:
1. I, (Name of Employee), and (Name of Domestic Partner) reside together
and intend to do so indefinitely at: (Address) and share common necessities of
life;
2. We affirm that the effective date of this domestic partnership is (Date)
and that this domestic partnership has been in existence for a period of six (6)
consecutive months, at least, prior to the date identified on this affidavit. We
understand that documentation will be required.
3. We are not married to anyone.
4. We are at least eighteen (18) years of age or older.
5. We are not related by blood closer than would bar marriage in the State
of California and are mentally competent to consent to contract.
6. We are each other's sole domestic partner and intend to remain so indefi-
nitely and are responsible for our common welfare.
7. We understand that domestic partners are subject to the same 30-day
"window" periods governing all other employees who are covered by or apply-
ing for health plan coverage. New children, new employees, adoptions, new
marriages and domestic partnerships are all subject to a 30-day limit on the
enrollment period beginning on the date of the event.
8. We agree to notify the City if there is any change of circumstances at-
tested to in this Affidavit within thirty (30) days of the change by filing a
State of Termination of Domestic Partnership. Such termination statement
shall be on a form provided by the City and shall affirm under penalty of
perjury that the partnership is terminated and that a copy of the termination
statement has been mailed to the other partner.
9. After such termination I, (Name of Employee), understand that another
Affidavit of Domestic Partnership cannot be filed until six (6) months after a
statement of termination of the previous partnership has been filed with the
Risk Management Office.
10. We understand that any persons/employer/company who suffer any loss
because of false statement[s] contained in an Affidavit of Domestic Partner-
ship may bring a civil action against us to recover their losses including rea-
sonable attorney's fees.
11. We provide the information in this Affidavit to be used by the City for
the sole purpose of determining our eligibility for domestic partnership bene-
fits. We understand that this information will be held confidential and will be
subject to disclosure only upon our express written authorization or pursuant
to a court order.
12. We affirm under penalty of perjury, that the assertions in this Affidavit
are true to the best of our knowledge.
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